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Introduction
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on topics in applied microeconomet-
rics, transport economics, and applied microeconomic theory.
At least since Hannibal’s invasion into Italy, the difficulties of crossing the Alps have
been revealed. Overcoming this natural bottleneck requires traveling across high-
altitude passes or, somewhat more recently, through road and rail tunnels that are
expensive to build and maintain. Even today, safety remains a vital political issue
fueled by repeated fatal accidents at various alpine crossings. The first part of this
thesis sheds light on the economics behind freight route choice and investment in
road and rail infrastructure. Chapters 1 and 2 evaluate hypothetical changes in the
availability of transalpine transport infrastructure in terms of substitution patterns
and effects on consumer welfare.
In Chapter 1, we analyze the expected effects of building a transalpine rail tunnel
between Lyon and Turin on i) the market shares of incumbent and entrant freight
transport service suppliers, and ii) consumer surplus. Such a large infrastructure
project, the Lyon-Turin Transalpine, has been planned for decades and preparatory
construction works have begun recently. It consists of a 53km rail tunnel providing
freight shippers with a new alpine path. Modeling transport decisions such as route
choice and pricing is a complex task. Data including all complexities are rare and
a model’s virtue is to reduce complex reality to economically relevant trade-offs.
We aim to shed light on inter-modal transalpine freight transport decisions having
merely aggregate volume measures at hand. We employ a simple numerical equilib-
rium model following Ivaldi and Vibes (2008), where freight shippers choose a mode
and alpine path to ship goods from a given origin to a given destination. Freight
carriers strategically set prices for the differentiated products they supply. The base
decision model is a nested logit discrete choice model as in, for example, McFadden
(1973), Berry (1994), and Ortu´zar (2001). The nested logit model has a closed-form
solution for individuals’ choice probabilities which, in markets with many consumers,
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can be approximated by aggregate market shares. Due to its analytical simplicity,
we can calibrate this demand model and the supply side to observed market shares,
prices, route characteristics, and cost measures. Using the equilibrium parameters,
demand elasticities and within-nest correlation, we perform counterfactual simula-
tions to investigate demand and supply side reactions to the introduction of a new
rail alternative.
For our analysis, we define the following three geographical sub-markets: a re-
gional short-distance market (Lyon - Turin, 315km), a wider North-South market
(Paris - Milano, 850km), and a West-East market (Madrid - Milano, 1575km). We
find limited substitutability between freight transport products on a North-South
transit axis. On the Paris-Milano market, the shippers’ decision remains largely
based on mode choice. The new high-quality rail alternative attracts new demand
but does not succeed in lowering road demand. When we shorten this axis to the
regional market between Lyon and Turin, both a modal shift and an increase in
demand for shipping occur, showing the same variations in the market share of the
outside option and consumer surplus as in the Paris-Milano market. In contrast
to the North-South axis, the West-East transit market appears a better candidate
for modal shift. Between Madrid and Milano, the new rail link appears sufficiently
attractive for shippers to switch modes. Overall traffic does not increase after the in-
troduction of the new link, suggesting higher volatility of shippers’ preferences across
products on this transit axis. Should European rail integration be fostered, the new
transalpine link between Lyon and Turin could play a complementary part among
other projects. It would be of interest to compare the respective impacts on the
West-East transit axis of the Lyon-Turin Transalpine and the Perpignan-Figueras
Transpyrenees between France and Spain.
Based on our analysis, the construction of a new high quality infrastructure
may only be one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented policy toolbox. For the
French-Italian alpine corridor, more direct and committed intervention based on a
variety of policy measures may open a fruitful path to the political goal of increas-
ing modal shift towards rail. We show that a scheme as observed in Switzerland,
where cross-subsidies from rail to road generate incentives for modal shift, are a
valid complement to investment in new rail infrastructure and even, to some extent,
a reasonable substitute.
In Chapter 2, we further investigate consumer welfare in transalpine freight transport
using micro-data on individual route choice. We tackle two core questions in this
chapter. First, to what extent does the way we model unobserved heterogeneity
matter for welfare estimates in discrete choice models? Second, what is the loss
in consumer surplus per year from shutting down a transalpine road infrastructure
such as the Mont Blanc tunnel? Closing this tunnel has been increasingly proposed
in the political debate following several fatal road accidents in large alpine tunnels.
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The most severe accident, in the Mont Blanc in 1999, led to a full closure of the
tunnel over a period of 3 years. As in Chapter 1, we model route choice as a discrete
choice among a number of mutually exclusive alternatives. Due to our rich data, we
can flexibly model unobserved heterogeneity of decision makers in their valuation of
money and time. Decision makers may be heterogenous for a number of reasons. For
example, the value of alternatives may depend on the weight or type of commodity
a truck is transporting. These are examples for observable heterogeneity which are
easily controlled for. However, the value of money and time is also likely to depend
on unobservable truck characteristics. These could be en route pick-ups of goods,
special logistic needs, or truck drivers’ personal tastes that favor one route over
another. Modeling such unobserved heterogeneity in the discrete choice framework
has been at the heart of research analyzing economic choices during the last two
decades. The workhorse model has been the random coefficients, or mixed, logit
model, presented in detail by McFadden and Train (2000). More recently, researchers
have started asking how the way we model unobserved heterogeneity affects policy-
relevant measures such as price elasticities or consumer welfare. Hensher and Greene
(2003) as well as Cherchi and Polak (2005) are early contributions highlighting the
potential importance of these unresolved modeling issues. To our knowledge, the
only existing contribution evaluating implications on consumer welfare are Hynes
et al. (2008). In a destination choice setting of whitewater sites in Ireland, they
analyze differences between the random coefficient model and a latent class model
in consumer surplus estimates.
We contribute to this literature by applying a recently proposed flexible nonpara-
metric estimator of unobserved heterogeneity to a random coefficients logit model
and investigating the impact of parametric assumptions on a measure of consumer
welfare. By definition, we expect the assumptions we make on the distribution of
preferences to have an impact on our measure of consumer surplus. Bajari et al.
(2007, 2010), henceforth BFKR, propose an estimator of unobserved heterogeneity
in a general class of economic models, using sieve methods. In a nutshell, their idea
is to approximate the true underlying taste distribution by a finite grid in the pref-
erence space. In general, such methods require large sample sizes as the data must
supply the model structure. Their motivating example is a random coefficients logit
model with individual-level data and they provide convincing Monte Carlo evidence.
To our knowledge, we are the first to apply their estimator to real-world data in a
static discrete choice model with random coefficients.
To identify the underlying structural parameters, we use a large scale individual
choice data set in a transport context. In particular, we use the 2004 Cross-Alpine
Freight Transport survey data to investigate the economic choice of transalpine
freight traffic. We exploit exogenous variation in travel cost and time arising from
the fixed geographic locations of origin, destination, and alpine crossing points.
While endogeneity concerns are less important with individual-level data, we dis-
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cuss several potential sources of endogeneity bias such as congestion or weather
conditions. We find that parametric assumptions and the dimensionality of mod-
eled unobserved heterogeneity have a significant impact on welfare results. Our
BFKR estimates predict economically significantly higher annual losses in user sur-
plus due to the Mont-Blanc tunnel closure. The latter implies a loss of e5.39 Mio
and the parametric random coefficients logit model a loss of e2.97 Mio in specifi-
cations where both price and time are assumed to have random coefficients. With
one random coefficient, the BFKR estimate is almost double that of the parametric
random coefficients logit estimate, e7.09 Mio versus e3.62 Mio. Compared to the
logit with fixed coefficients and the BFKR estimates, both parametric random co-
efficient specifications underestimate the loss in consumer surplus.
In Chapter 3, we contribute to the empirical literature on effort incentives in con-
tests. In many situations, applicants compete for a limited number of positions, and
selection is based on perceived skill or talent, for example in hiring and promotion
procedures or in nominations of election candidates by political parties.
We provide a theory of agents’ effort incentives in such situations and test the
predictions of this theory using data from professional soccer. Our theory introduces
signal jamming as in career concerns models a` la Holmstro¨m (1982) in rank-order
tournaments1, allowing for asymmetries between agents. We show that incentives
are strongest in close contests, i.e., when several agents have similar ex ante winning
probabilities. In some contexts, higher effort also increases the risk of an injury
and/or leads to exhaustion. When competing for a position that requires continued
fitness, candidates who are confident that their reputation sufficiently exceeds that
of other contestants may find it optimal to exert less than normal effort.
We test these predictions using a panel data set on the German Soccer League in
the seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08. A subset of players belong to nations that qualified
for the Euro Cup in summer 2008, the Euro 2008, the most prestigious international
soccer Cup alongside the World Cup, and thus participated in a nomination contest.
All other players belong to nations either outside of Europe, thus being excluded
from the Euro Cup by definition, or in Europe that did not qualify for Euro 2008.
The latter serve as a natural control group as they work in exactly the same club
environment while facing comparable mechanisms of reputation formation. We thus
observe variation that lends very well to a difference-in-difference analysis. Most
importantly, we are able to measure reputation asymmetries which, as we will show,
enables us to identify incentive effects depending on relative reputation along the
entire range of reputations. Our measure is based on participation in past national
team games, that is, the number of game nominations by national coaches. We
provide evidence that our measure is a good proxy of players’ reputations.
1See Lazear and Rosen (1981) for the theoretical framework of rank-order tournaments, Ehren-
berg and Bognanno (1990) for early empirical evidence, and Prendergast (1999) for a survey.
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We are aware of two empirical contributions showing the relevance of player
asymmetries on incentive effects in tournaments. They are both examples from golf
tournaments. Brown (2010) analyzes performances in tournaments in which players
do and do not compete against a real golf superstar, Tiger Woods. She finds that
players underperform in tournaments in which they compete against Tiger Woods
and, thus, have a close to zero chance of winning. This measure is a binary measure
having either a positive value smaller than or equal to one or being equal to zero. In
the second paper, Franke (2010) analyzes biased golf tournaments. There are two
types of amateur golf tournaments in Germany, gross and net tournaments. In the
latter, players are ranked by the deviation from their pre-tournament handicap while
in gross tournaments rankings are as in standard professional golf tournaments. He
uses this variation to identify performance effects due to varying winning proba-
bilities. Using our continuous proxy of winning probabilities, we are able to track
the equilibrium relation between asymmetric reputations and effort more closely. In
particular, in contrast to the existing literature, our measure covers the area close
and up to probabilities equal to one in a setting where winning the tournament
leads to subsequent career opportunities. The latter allows us to identify the effect
of injury (or exhaustion) concerns predicted by our theoretical model.
We find a large positive effect of nomination contest participation on several out-
put measures, for example the number of ball contacts, for players with intermediate
chances of being nominated. For players whose nominations chances are very high,
however, the effect of contest participation is negative. That means that players
whose uncertainty over their (non-)nomination is highest will exert the most effort
in order to positively influence their national team coaches’ nomination decisions.
Players who are certain of (not) being nominated do not have any incentive to exert
extra effort since it will have no impact on the decision. Much rather do (almost)
certainly nominated players reduce effort in club games in order to avoid injuries
that may jeopardize their Euro Cup participation.
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Chapter 1
Entry and Competition in Freight
Transport:
The Case of a Prospective
Transalpine Rail Link between
France and Italy
joint with Delphine Prady
1 Introduction
The Alps have long posed challenges to European transport infrastructure planners.
Overcoming this bottleneck requires high-altitude Alpine passes or road and rail
tunnels which are difficult and expensive to build and maintain. A comparably large
infrastructure project outside of the Alps has been the Channel Tunnel, for example,
connecting France and the United Kingdom via rail. Kay et al. (1989) predict
the social and private profitability of the Channel Tunnel project. In this paper,
we analyze partial economic returns of public investment in a specific and much
debated transalpine rail infrastructure. To do so, we employ a simple equilibrium
model and, by numerical simulation, compute the changes in direct infrastructure
users’ surplus. This approach can ultimately be integrated into a more elaborate
cost-benefit analysis.1
1De Jong et al. (2005) present a survey on welfare evaluation in the discrete choice random
utility framework.
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More precisely, we analyze the competitiveness of freight transport supply by rail
and road carriers on the Lyon-Turin corridor. We perform an equilibrium analysis in
the context of a discrete choice model (see Anderson et al., 1992, or McFadden, 1981)
which allows to analyze demand and competitive supply of differentiated products.
We predict the reactions of all competitors given strategies and consumer behavior
when facing a new product. In our case, the new product is a prospective high speed
rail link between Lyon and Turin, “La Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin”.2
We simulate the entry of this new transalpine link on three different markets:
regional transport between Lyon and Turin, transit between Spain and Lombardia,
and transit between Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia. As an alternative policy
measure we simulate a deliberate change in some alternatives’ cost structure, that is
the introduction of a higher road tunnel fee combined with a hypothetical reduction
of rail costs. We find limited substitutability between freight transport products
– hereafter defined as a “mode+alpine path” bundle – on the North-South transit
axis where shippers’ choices remain largely mode-driven. The new high-quality rail
alternative does attract new demand but does not succeed in lowering demand for
road transport. On the regional market between Lyon and Turin, both a modal shift
and an overall increase in demand for shipping occur. The West-East transit market
appears the best candidate for modal-shift as, between Spain and the region of
Lombardia, the new rail link appears attractive enough for shippers to switch modes.
Should European rail integration be fostered, the new transalpine link between Lyon
and Turin could play a complementary part among other European projects.
Moreover, based on our analysis, the construction of a new high quality infras-
tructure may only be one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented policy toolbox.
For the French Alpine corridor, more direct and committed intervention based on a
variety of policy measures as observed in Switzerland may open a more fruitful path
to the political goal of increasing modal shift towards rail.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our demand-and-
supply model. We present our data set in section 4 and provide our empirical
analysis and simulation results in section 3. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modeling Lyon-Turin Freight Transport
Our goal is to evaluate the prospective changes in social welfare of a rail infrastruc-
ture project. In our setting, based on Ivaldi and Vibes (2008), consumers, hereafter
called shippers,3 choose a transport mode, that is rail or road, and an alpine path
2The gains in speed for freight trains are mainly driven by significantly reduced slopes, namely
down to 12% from currently 30%, in the prospective base tunnel. Detailed information is available
on the web sites http://www.ltf-sas.com and http://www.transalpine.com/
3“Consumers” can also be seen as logistic intermediaries acting on behalf of goods producers.
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to carry their goods between two specific regions. Suppliers, hereafter called freight
carriers,4 are assumed to compete in prices. We then derive the market equilibrium
and provide results of counterfactual experiments.
As a first remark, we concentrate on non-combined5 transport modes in the
present analysis. Indeed, we have learned from several phone interviews with freight
logistic firms6 that such a mode is of little importance for most of their shipping
activity. To a large extent, that is a peculiarity to the French transport sector
in which, historically, the road has been the dominant mode of freight transport.
Note also that freight services are not homogenous goods but consist of a widely
diversified set of goods with specific haulage requirements and logistic needs. This
heterogeneity is to some extent accounted for by equilibrium prices set according
to commodity characteristics (such as freshness or hazardousness) which make one
choice alternative more attractive than another. Given that we have information
on broad commodity classes and aggregate price data only, we conduct our analysis
based on these aggregate data. Our model is, in this respect, stylized and simplified
but would lend to a more detailed analysis if more disaggregate data were available.
In practice, transaction price data on transport services are particularly hard to ob-
tain on a broad basis. Despite this limitation, aggregate data do contain information
allowing to contribute policy-relevant conclusions.
Furthermore, as a spatial concern, one needs to distinguish between transit and
regional freight transport. Transit and short-distance freight carriers exhibit dif-
ferent company characteristics. For example, long-haul transit freight carriers are
rather firms with more than 50 employees, short- and mid-haul freight carriers are
rather smaller firms.7 Accounting for distance-differentiated markets enables us to
better characterize competition between products. Indeed, it is unclear whether
inter-modal competition is fiercer on long or short distance freight transport mar-
kets. Hence, we consider three types of markets targeted by suppliers that can
be subsumed into two broader market categories, transit and regional transport.
“Transit North-South” (freight traffic between Ile-de-France-Nord8 and Lombardia)
and “Transit East-West” between Spain and Lombardia were chosen based on their
important relative shares of French-Italian transalpine passages. We define as short-
distance transport freight traffic between the area of Lyon and the area of Turin.
Freight traffic on these three markets amounts to 12.6% of total alpine freight traffic
reported during the studied period. While this appears a low figure, the traffic scale
4For example, SNCF and Trenitalia for the Lyon-Turin rail project.
5Combined modes can be both accompanied and unaccompanied transport, where the former
corresponds to piggyback transport and the latter to intermodal container transports. Piggyback
transport is non-existent in our sample.
6GEODIS Calberson GE, GEFCO Network, among others.
7London Economics (2003)
8Ile-de-France-Nord defines the metropolitan area of Paris and neighboring regions but excludes
the Benelux countries.
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should not affect competition between the different alpine products. Rather than
traffic volume, geographic coverage matters in a product’s competitiveness. Figure
1 illustrates these three markets.
2.1 Demand side
Assume a shipper takes a two-step decision:
• first, she decides which mode she wants to carry her commodity with;
• second, she chooses an alpine path.9
The second step is motivated as follows. A shipper has an a priori ranking of paths.
This idiosyncratic ranking is based on characteristics of the shipped goods and of
alpine paths. Different paths exhibit different technical characteristics, as detailed
below. An alternative is thus a combination of a transport mode and a path to
cross the Alps. Product differentiation is mainly due to geographical and regulatory
aspects.10 We assume that shippers have in mind these qualitative differences of
available products when sending their goods on a given origin-destination journey
(hereafter O–D). In addition to competing differentiated mode-path combinations,
we assume the existence of an outside good, OG. It accounts for shippers that are
interested in transporting their goods across the Alps by rail or road, yet currently
do not. Thus, it represents a potential niche suppliers can target, inducing additional
traffic. This is important to bear in mind since aggregate consumer welfare increases
with additional traffic.
We classify J alternatives into G groups, where g = 0, 1, 2. Group 0 corresponds
to the OG, 1 and 2 correspond to rail and road, respectively. Shipper i’s utility
associated with alternative j is:
Uij = Vj + ij (1)
where:
• Vj is the mean utility level common to all shippers,
• ij corresponds to the departure of shipper i from the common utility level
(also called random part, that is shipper i’s unknown idiosyncratic taste for
product j).
The random component leading to a nested logit demand model can be further
decomposed as follows:
ij = σ νig + (1− σ) νij (2)
9The available alpine path are: Mont Blanc, Frejus, Vintimille, Montgenevre, or Mont-Cenis.
10Specific haulage requirements, logistic needs, and conveyed goods.
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of three considered markets
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with σ being the degree of correlation between alternatives j belonging to the same
group g. A high σ implies shippers give a higher weight to the group than to the
alternative itself when they pick one. Competition is then fiercer between modes
than between alpine paths. To be consistent with the random utility maximization
concept, the parameter σ must lie between 0 and 1. In the extreme case of symmetric
competition where the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)11
holds between all alternatives, σ equals 0 and the model reduces to the simple
logit specification. In the other extreme of segmentation, where preferences for
alternatives are perfectly correlated within nests but independent between nests, σ
is equal to 1.
Random components νig, νij, and consequently ij are standard extreme value
distributed.
We assume the mean utility level to be:
Vj = Ψj − h pj (3)
where:
• Ψj is the aggregate measure of quality of product j
• h represents the sensitivity of utility to price, that is the marginal utility of
cost saving for the shipper.
We then compute the aggregate measure of quality as the weighted sum of the
alternatives’ characteristics:
Ψj = α1 punctualityj + α2 altj + α3 traveltimej + α4maxcapaj (4)
where:
• punctualityj = ratio of highway kilometers over total road kilometers and
actual published punctuality figures12 for road and rail, respectively; expected
positive sign for α1.
• altj = altitude, in meters, of path j; expected negative sign for α2.
• traveltimej; expected negative sign for α3.
• maxcapaj = maximum capacity per unit of transportation; expected positive
sign for α4.
11See McFadden (1981).
12See SBB Cargo’s Annual Report (2004, page 18) and at SNCF:
http://fret.sncf.com/fr/quisnous/actu/2007/presse/do070618.pdf
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We attach specific values to these variables, respective to each product. Some
values deserve further explanation.
Variable traveltimej includes compulsory drivers’ breaks. Every 4 hours and half,
a truck driver has to rest for 45 minutes; after 9 hours of driving, a truck driver has
to stop and rest for 10 hours.
Variable punctualityj codes for the probability for a freight carrier to meet his travel
time target. This is a reliability measure. Even though obviously correlated, vari-
ables punctualityj and traveltimej do not exactly capture the same path features.
Variable maxcapaj indicates the maximum tonnage one unit load can carry. This
takes into account the fact that there is a more strict heavy goods weight constraint
on using road transport as compared to rail. Finally, variable altj mainly codes for
changing conditions of mountainous weather.
We assume these four speed and reliability measures to be the most relevant
for shippers in order to assess quality of available products. Shipper i chooses the
utility-maximizing alternative j, satisfying:
Uij ≥ Uik ∀ k 6= j (5)
Normalizing the mean utility of the outside good to zero, we compute the proba-
bility of choosing alternative j from the probability of choosing group g and the
probability of choosing alternative j conditional on choosing group g. We apply the
methodology proposed by Berry (1994) and widely used in the estimation of differ-
entiated products demand.13 This methodology builds upon the assumption that
observed aggregate market shares are valid approximations of choice probabilities.
It allows us to derive the mean utility levels as follows:
ln sj − ln s0 = Ψj − h pj + σ ln sj/g (6)
with sj and sj/g respectively being the total market share and the group market
share of alternative j.
Finally, the own price elasticity of demand of the alternative j is:
µj = h pj
[
sj − 1
1− σ +
σ
1− σ sj/g
]
∀ j ∈ g (7)
2.2 Supply side
We focus on the competitive aspect of cross-alpine freight transport. Competing
freight carriers offer shippers a differentiated product combining a transport mode
with a specific alpine tunnel or pass – Mont Blanc, Frejus, Montgenevre, Vintimille,
Mont-Cenis or Gotthard (see Figure 2.2).14
13See, for example, Ackerberg et al. (2007) and Ortu´zar (2001).
14We consider the Gotthard passage only on the transit market between Ile-de-France-Nord and
Lombardia. Its road and rail market shares are sufficiently high (respectively 5.9 % and 2.0 % of
Chapter 1: Entry and Competition in Freight Transport 15
ROAD RAIL OG
Vintim
ille
………M
o
nt
 Bla
n
c
N
e
w
 Link
…M
o
nt
-C
e
nis
Figure 2: Basic discrete choice model
In 2004, the ‘Autoroute Ferroviaire Alpine’, a joint venture between SNCF and
TRENITALIA providing a rail shuttle service for lorries and semi-trailers through
the Fre´jus tunnel, has been experimented and its related traffic reported in our data.
However, the generated traffic was so low and the restrictions so numerous that we
do not consider this alternative relevant for our analysis. It remains to be seen if
this mode of transport will prove successful in the long run.
We assume that each differentiated product is offered by one firm only. This
simplifies reality to a large extent. In particular, the road freight industry is quite
atomistic. In the aggregate, 77.6% of road freight carriers employed 0 to 5 people
and 2.3% of all transport companies had more than 50 employees in France in 2000.
In terms of revenue, freight carriers with less than 50 employees accounted for 59.4%
their group market) for these two products to be considered as relevant competitive alternatives
on this market.
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of the industry’s total revenue.15 Given this structure of road supply, competition
is likely to be fierce among road carriers. Therefore, we would intuitively think
the latter to be price-takers rather than makers. Notwithstanding, we argue that
demand is rather captive on each geographical market. This justifies to some extent
the strategic role of road carriers as price-makers. In what follows, we assume that
road carriers have some power to set prices above marginal cost.16
In equilibrium, cross-alpine freight carriers set transport prices in order to max-
imize their profits, knowing their competitors do the same:
Max Πj = (pj– − cj) qj– −K (8)
with fixed costs K.
The outcome is defined by the set of J necessary first order conditions, from
Ivaldi and Verboven (2005):
pj = cj +
1− σ
h
(
1− σ sj/g − (1− σ) sj
) (9)
The price of a product j is therefore the sum of its marginal cost, cj, and a
mark-up term.
3 Empirical Analysis and Results
Shippers’ and freight carriers’ actions depend on their sensitivities to changes in the
alternatives’ characteristics. We want to measure the impact the prospective rail
link between Lyon and Turin will have on the equilibrium market shares, prices and
consumer surplus. Before rushing into the simulation analysis, we need to derive
the equilibrium features of our three markets, where shippers can choose only from
current available alternatives. Our data, reported in Appendix A, prevents straight
statistical estimation of the model. Therefore, we need to calibrate the model, that
is to find the equilibrium values of the demand parameters, h and σ, as well as
the quality parameters in Equation 4. We can then define the equilibrium outcome
and simulate likely changes following the new link’s introduction. All numerical
computations were done using Matlab.
3.1 Model Calibration
Following the procedure by Ivaldi and Vibes (2008), we first derive the demand
parameters h and σ. To do so, we linearize Equation 7 defining price elasticities.
15EUROSTAF (2003), page 4.
16Ivaldi (2007) maintains this assumption analogously.
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Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes
Short-distance Transit North-South Transit East-West
Share of outside alternative in% 15 30 45 15 30 45 15 30 45
Road Market Shares
Mont-Blanc 7.0 5.8 4.5 34.5 28.5 22.4 - - -
Frejus 57.4 47.2 37.2 34.6 28.5 22.4 0.8 0.6 0.5
in % Montgenevre 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.04 0.03 0.02
Vintimille 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 83.76 68.97 54.18
Gotthard - - - 5.0 4.1 3.2 - - -
Rail Market Shares
Mont-Cenis 18.8 15.5 12.2 8.0 6.6 5.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
in %
Vintimille - - - - - - 0.2 0.2 0.2
Gotthard - - - 1.7 1.4 1.1 - - -
Marginal utility of cost saving
0.006 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(Parameter h)
Degree of within-group correlation
0.40 0.44 0.52 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.62
(Parameter σ)
Own-Price Elasticities
Mont-Blanc -4.27 -4.11 -4.19 -1.81 -1.85 -1.89 - - -
Frejus -1.48 -1.63 -1.73 -1.87 -1.92 -1.96 -6.93 -6.93 -6.78
(Road) Montgenevre -3.70 -3.54 -3.61 -3.25 -3.21 -3.2 -6.93 -6.93 -6.78
Vintimille -5.86 -5.60 -5.71 -4.34 -4.28 -4.22 -0.53 -0.98 -1.20
Gotthard - - - -2.99 -2.96 -2.93 - - -
Own-Price Elasticities
Mont-Cenis -1.63 -1.53 -1.38 -1.23 -1.22 -1.21 -3.57 -3.58 -3.36
(Rail)
Vintimille - - - - - - -3.47 -3.48 -3.25
Gotthard - - - -2.37 -2.34 -2.31 - - -
Consumer Surplus 296 160 43.8 1556 780 190 1092 528 150
Notes: Market shares are computed from aggregate CAFT 2004 data. All other parameters result from our
calibrated model.
We do not have data on elasticities but we do have data on market shares, prices,
and, contrary to Ivaldi and Vibes (2008), marginal costs. We repeatedly draw 1000
vectors of elasticities, based on the normal distribution function, with a standard
deviation of 4. We set the mean of this distribution to be equal to the commodity-
specific values presented in Oum et al. (1990), weighted by the commodity shares
transported on each link. We then obtain values of h and σ to each draw of 1000
elasticity vectors using ordinary least squares estimation. These values allow us to
derive a marginal cost vector from Equation 9 for each of these draws. We finally
keep the h and σ values, as well as the associated vector of elasticities µj, which
correspond to the closest match of predicted marginal costs with our vector of ob-
served marginal costs. We use these results to solve the system of equations defining
first the quality parameters Ψj, second the quality components described in Section
2.1 and Appendix A.1, and third their coefficients in Equation 4. We thus solve a
system of five linear equations and four unkowns, and derive consumers’ valuations
of each quality variable. We present the results on elasticity and parameter values
in Table 1. Note that the elasticity values are calibrated to our very specific markets
and thus cannot be easily interpreted outside of these markets nor be directly com-
pared to estimates in the literature that stem from different markets or are aggregate
averages.
Small values of h underline the intuitive fact that individuals have a larger
marginal utility of income than a firm’s marginal utility of saving costs. On both
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transit markets, h is even lower. Indeed, as pointed out in section 2, long-distance
freight shippers are rather large companies while short- and medium-distance freight
shippers tend to be relatively small companies. Intuitively, it makes sense that the
latter care more about cost savings.
The high value of σ shows low substitutability between the nests of differentiated
products in the alpine freight transport market. The mode choice remains the main
component of the shippers’ decision.
In terms of market shares, only the transit market between Spain and Lombardia
exhibits a true dominant alternative: Vintimille (road). This remains true whatever
the OG market share. This demand rigidity is also reflected in the price-elasticities
ranking on this specific market since the lowest price-elasticity is associated with the
Vintimille (road) alternative. More generally, the model endogenously implies that
small market shares go along with high absolute values of elasticities. Therefore
market shares’ rankings on our three markets directly translate into elasticities’
rankings, in absolute values. We present values of the quality indices and the weights
of the quality indices’ components in Table 2. All coefficients have the expected
signs.
As we do not know the exact market configuration, we allow the OG share to vary
between 15 and 45% of the total freight transport market. Alpine traffic forecasts
could help to determine the situation we are in. However, these forecasts differ across
scenarios and do not appear reliable. Indeed, most of them are suspected to largely
overestimate freight alpine traffic by the years 2020 and 2030.17 In what follows
we focus on the “OG = 15%” case for our equilibrium and simulation analysis.
Qualitatively, the results carry over to the two scenarios with larger OG market
shares.
17ECMT Report (2001)
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3.2 Simulations and Results
We can now simulate the entry of the new rail link using its quality characteristics
and the demand parameters from the calibrated model. Appendix C elaborates this
procedure in more detail.
3.2.1 Results in the short-distance market between Lyon and Turin
Table 3 shows results for different initial market shares of the outside alternative in
point-to-point transport between Lyon and Turin.18
A global overview of our first simulation result underlines three important effects
of the new link provision in the regional market. First, the two rail alternatives man-
age to capture more than 37% of the total inter-regional traffic, the new transalpine
link taking most of it (27%). Second, the two incumbent Fre´jus products (road and
rail) lose the most after the introduction of the new link. Third, consumer surplus
increases by almost 6%.
Table 3: Introduction of the new transalpine rail link, short-distance
Short-distance (Lyon-Turin)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Mont-Blanc 481 +12.6% 486 +2.3% 483 +1.7%
Frejus 555 +13.5% 561 +14.7% 556 +13.7%
Montgenevre 239 -37.6% 243 -36.5% 241 -37.1%
Vintimille 398 -33.6% 403 -33.0% 401 -33.2%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 343 0.0% 344 +0.3% 339 -1.2%
New Transalpine Link 434 - 460 - 462 -
Road market shares in %
Mont-Blanc 7.1 -4.0% 5.8 0.0% 4.8 +6.6%
Frejus 32.0 -44.6% 26.8 -43.2% 22.4 -40.0%
Montgenevre 5.8 +346.0% 4.5 +310.0% 3.8 +322.0%
Vintimille 3.5 +600.0% 2.7 +575.0% 2.3 +666.0%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 10.2 -45.7% 7.5 -51.6% 5.1 -58.2%
New Transalpine Link 27.6 - 25.1 - 19.6 -
Market share of outside alternative in % 13.8 - 8.0% 27.7 -7.6% 42.1 -6.4%
Consumer surplus 313 + 6.0% 181 +13.0% 69.6 +60.0%
The rail mode plays a very important part and appears fairly competitive on the
inter-regional market between Lyon and Turin. Facing the biggest loss in terms of
market shares, the representative supplier of the Frejus road product nevertheless
increases its prices by 13.5%. Its historical competitors tend to align their prices
around an average of 365 euros.
Going into detail, we see that prices do not vary homogenously. The two main
road alternatives, Fre´jus and Mont-Blanc, increase their prices by similar amounts:
18The new alternative is assumed to have the same marginal cost as the historical Mont-Cenis
alternative served by SNCF since we do not have expected cost data for the new alternative. In
principle, implementing a variation in cost would be straightforward.
Chapter 1: Entry and Competition in Freight Transport 21
13.5% and 12.6% respectively. By contrast, the two “outsider” road products, Mont-
gene`vre and Vintimille, cut their prices by quite large amounts: 37.6% and 33.6%
respectively.
The rather captive Frejus demand19 and its high quality index relative to the
other alternatives explain most of the price reaction to the new rail product. Indeed,
these two features allow the Frejus road supplier to compensate its loss in market
share - mostly to the benefit of the new rail alternative - by a price increase. The
less competitive Montgene`vre road and Vintimille road providers benefit from the
weaker market position of the Frejus road alternative. They even compete more
fiercely20 to gain market shares at the expense of the Frejus road supplier. Therefore,
road carriers’ reactions to the entry of the new “Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin”
depend on their relative historic market power. Historic dominant providers are
very sensitive to the induced inter-modal competition and consecutively alter their
pricing behavior to compensate their loss in market shares. Historic “outsiders” take
advantage of their competitors’ weaker posture and toughen their pricing strategies
in order to get “a bigger piece of the bigger cake”.
The substantial increase in the rail market share is partly due to the increase
of global market size.21 However, most of it results from a modal shift in favor
of the new rail alternative. Undoubtedly, the strong market position of the new
link comes at the expense of the historical rail alternative Mont-Cenis. The latter,
however, manages to keep a reasonable share of total regional traffic, thanks to its
price competitiveness relative to the two main road products. As for the new link,
its high quality index as well as its competitive price make it a viable competitor of
the two main road alternatives on the regional market. Note, however, that we are
looking at a very specific short-distance market. We thus have to be cautious when
comparing the change in market shares to ones in more geographically aggregate
settings.
As a concluding remark, the introduction of a high quality alternative and the
decrease in the OG’s market share induce an improvement of consumer surplus.
However, this consumer gain remains of rather low magnitude.
3.2.2 Results in the transit market between Ile-de-France and Lombar-
dia
Table 4 shows the results for freight journeys between the Ile-de-France and Lom-
bardia regions.
Three salient facts summarize behaviors on this North-South freight transit mar-
ket. First, intra-modal competition within both nests is fierce. Second, the new rail
19See the own price elasticity µFrejus = −1.48.
20There are no tunnel fees for these passages. Hence, substantially lower marginal costs allow
significant price drops.
21See the OG share decrease of 8%.
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alternative captures 11.2% of the total market, quasi as much as the Gotthard
(11.4%) which ranks third among road products. Third, consumer surplus increases
by 6%.
Table 4: Introduction of the new transalpine rail link, North-South
Transit North-South (Ile-de-France-Lombardia)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Mont-Blanc 1097 +4.0% 1101 +4.2% 1095 +3.7%
Frejus 1121 +2.5% 1125 +3.0% 1118 +2.3%
Montgenevre 704 -37.0% 709 -36.3% 713 -36.0%
Vintimille 843 -43.5% 847 -43.3% 849 -43.1%
Gotthard 754 -30.5% 757 -30.2% 757 -30.2%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 916 -0.4% 916 -0.4% 917 -0.3%
Gotthard 868 -5.0% 872 -5.5% 876 -4.0%
New Transalpine Link 1231 - 1269 - 1294 -
Road market shares in %
Mont-Blanc 26.6 -23.0% 22.2 -22.1% 17.9 -20.1%
Frejus 27.7 -20.0% 23.1 -19.0% 18.6 -17.0%
Montgenevre 1.2 +200.0% 1.0 +233.0% 0.7 +133.0%
Vintimille 4.4 +450.0% 3.6 +500.0% 2.7 +440.0%
Gotthard 11.4 +128.0% 9.4 +129.0% 7.3 +128.0%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 3.1 -61.2% 2.4 -63.6% 1.8 -65.4%
Gotthard 0.7 -59.0% 0.6 -57.1% 0.4 -63.6%
New Transalpine Link 11.2 - 9.9 - 8.2 -
Market share of outside alternative in % 13.7 -8.0% 27.9 -7.0% 42.3 -6.0%
Consumer surplus 1649 +6.0% 876 +12.3% 295 +55.3%
As in the regional market, the entry of a higher quality rail product induces
“predatory” behavior among outsiders, namely Montgene`vre, Vintimille and Got-
thard road path providers, within the road nest. The latter engage in large price-cuts
– -37%, -43.5%, -30.5% respectively – in order to increase their market share – by
200%, 450% and 128% respectively – and take the best out of weakened dominant
Fre´jus and Mont-Blanc road suppliers. However, contrast with the regional market,
the new alternative does not trigger noticeable modal shift. It succeeds in attracting
new shippers in the market – 8% decrease in the OG share – but globally fails in
capturing demand from road alternatives. Its higher quality makes it the best rail
alternative despite a price even higher - 1231 euros against 1121 and 1097 euros -
than the ones of its two major road competitors, Mont-Blanc and Fre´jus. Neverthe-
less, the new link does not appear to be competitive relative to road supply. In this
respect the “Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin” alone cannot be the relevant modal
shift device its proponents claim it to be. At least not on the North-South transit
freight market. Therefore, only a more global transport policy scheme taking into
account the strategic behavior in both supply and demand may achieve a substantial
shift in transport modes.
Albeit of absolute importance, induced variations in prices and market shares do
not alter the historic relative ranking of the different alpine products.
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3.2.3 Results in the transit market between Spain and Lombardia
In the transit market between Spain and Italy shippers use the rail path in Vintimille.
In Table 5 we see that the new rail link does not significantly impact global demand
for shipping between Spain and Lombardia. Indeed, the decrease in the OG market
share only amounts to 0.5% and consumer surplus does not change at all. Therefore,
we conjecture that the new alternative’s 7% market share corresponds to a genuine
modal shift on this transit market. Indeed, the new link erodes road alternatives’
market edge of 6,5%. Add to this the 0.5% decrease in the outside good share, it
almost amounts to the total rail alternatives’ share.
Table 5: Introduction of the new transalpine rail link, East-West
Transit East-West (Spain-Lombardia)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Frejus 1165 -39.5% 1159 -40.0% 1158 -40.0%
Montgenevre 893 -53.2% 893 -53.2% 898 -53.0%
Vintimille 1995 +5.5% 1962 +3.7% 1941 +2.6%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 1189 -12.0% 1189 -12.0% 1195 -12.7%
Vintimille 1173 -13.2% 1173 -13.2% 1179 -12.7%
New Transalpine Link 1601 - 1598 - 1691 -
Road market shares in %
Frejus 13.6 +1600.0% 10.4 +1633.0% 7.6 +1420.0%
Montgenevre 1.6 +3900.0% 1.2 +3900.0% 0.85 +4150.0%
Vintimille 62.88 -25.0% 53.2 -22.8% 44.65 -17.6%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 0.01 -95.0% 0.007 -96.5% 0.005 -95.0%
Vintimille 0.01 -95.0% 0.008 -96.0% 0.005 -97.5%
New Transalpine Link 7.0 - 6.4 - 3.02 -
Market share of outside alternative in % 14.92 -0.5% 28.785 -0.4% 43.87 -2.5%
Consumer surplus 1092 0.0% 565 +7.0% 184 +22.6%
Far more striking, however, is the gain of the Frejus road alternative which
succeeds in elevating its market share by 12.8 percentage points due to strong price
competition. In this market, the latter alternative takes the outsider role benefitting
most from competitive price-setting on the dominant Vintimille alternative given its
extremely captive demand.
3.2.4 Results from a change in the cost structure in the transit market
between Ile-de-France and Lombardia
Table 6 shows results of a change in the cost structure in freight journeys between
the Ile-de-France region and Lombardia. We simulate a twofold increase of tunnel
fees at the Mont-Blanc and Frejus road tunnels and a simultaneous reduction of
marginal costs of rail transport by one half. We interpret this as a political measure
of cross-subsidizing from road to rail transport. The change in the cost structure
can achieve a modal shift comparable to that induced by the introduction of an
entirely new infrastructure.
Comparing Tables 4 and 6 reveals a comparable reduction of the main French
passages’ market shares by raising their tunnel fees. An important part of this
reduction is absorbed by the Gotthard road alternative tripling its market share due
to its cost advantage. Modal shift from road to rail is not as strong - 11.1% rail share
Chapter 1: Entry and Competition in Freight Transport 24
Table 6: Increase in road tunnel fees and reduction of rail marginal costs
Transit North-South (Ile-de-France-Lombardia)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Mont-Blanc 1275 +20.7% 1278 +21.1% 1272 +20.5%
Frejus 1297 +18.7% 1300 +19.0% 1294 +18.4%
Montgenevre 707 -36.6% 711 -36.2% 715 -35.8%
Vintimille 853 -42.9% 857 -42.6% 858 -42.5%
Gotthard 783 -27.8% 785 -27.6% 782 -27.9%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 916 -0.4% 925 +0.6% 931 +1.2%
Gotthard 682 -25.3% 688 -24.7% 693 -24.1%
Road market shares in %
Mont-Blanc 23.9 -31.1% 19.5 -31.6% 15.3 -31.5%
Frejus 24.9 -28.1% 20.4 -28.6% 16.0 -28.4%
Montgenevre 1.8 +331.8% 1.4 +317.1% 1.0 +296.2%
Vintimille 6.4 +753.6% 5.1 +719.3% 3.8 +676.7%
Gotthard 15.7 217.1% 12.6 +209.5% 9.7 +201.3%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 7.9 -1.0% 6.3 -3.3% 4.9 -5.5%
Gotthard 3.2 +92.6% 2.6 +88.2% 2.0 +82.8%
Market share of outside alternative in % 16.2 +8.0% 32.1 +7.0% 47.3 +5.1%
Consumer surplus 1471 -5.5% 690 -11.5% 103 -45.8%
as opposed to 15.0% when introducing the new alternative - and only present towards
the Gotthard rail passage. While the introduction of a new rail alternative induces
new traffic, the fact of higher road costs and lower rail costs increases the share of
the outside good. Given the absence of a new high-quality alternative, this political
measure therefore reduces total traffic as well as consumer surplus. The relevant
question is then whether the difference in consumer gains/losses over-compensates
the costs of building a new infrastructure. At the very least, this simulation exercise
illustrates that creating new infrastructure may not be an exclusive solution but
that there exist various alternative policy measures leading to a comparable end.
4 Conclusion
The model used in this paper allows to derive demand and supply equilibrium be-
havior in a market with product differentiation. We apply this model to the alpine
freight transport market with differentiated “mode & alpine path” products in order
to test the competitive viability of the prospective “Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin”
project.
As a first structural result we find limited substitutability between freight trans-
port products on a North-South transit axis, despite their heterogeneity beyond the
mere modal split. Indeed, on our Ile-de-France-Lombardia market, the shippers’
decision remains largely based on mode choice. The new high-quality rail alterna-
tive attracts new demand but does not succeed in reducing road demand. When we
shorten this axis to the regional market between Lyon and Turin, both a modal shift
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and an increase in demand for shipping occur, securing exactly the same variations
in OG market share and consumer surplus as in the North-South market. Therefore,
the global impact of the new link on the latter transit market seems to be driven by
local factors. The demand rigidity for road raises a methodological problem: mean
utility specification demands a profound knowledge of shippers’ choice criteria.22
Micro-level data – collected during face-to-face interviews for instance – would be of
great help in this respect. Precise criteria relevant for modal shift could be revealed
this way and appropriate policy measures undertaken.
In contrast with the North-South analysis, the West-East transit market appears
a better candidate for modal-shift. Between Spain and Lombardia indeed, the new
rail link appears attractive enough for shippers to switch modes. Note that global
traffic does not increase after the introduction of the new link, suggesting higher
volatility of shippers’ preferences on this transit axis. Should European rail inte-
gration be fostered, the new transalpine link between Lyon and Turin could play a
complementary part among other urgent projects. In this respect, it would be of in-
terest to compare respective impacts on the West-East transit axis of the Lyon-Turin
Transalpine and the Perpignan-Figueras Transpyrenees.23
From a modeling viewpoint, improving the approximation of product flexibility –
so far captured by variable “Punctuality” in our mean utility specification – should
receive particular attention in future studies on the subject. As a matter of fact
we believe the most obvious drawback of rail freight transport is its exclusivity :
choosing rail in Lyon excludes changing modes until Turin. A delay forecast after
the train departure cannot yet find remedy in a switch to a more flexible transport
mode. In this respect inter-modality seems to be the key component of a competitive
rail product. So far, however, inter-modal freight transport has not had the success
needed for a significant modal shift. In the French Alpes, the “Rolling Highway” has
been inexistent until 2005 when it accounted for 0.7% of total French Alpine freight
tonnage. The corresponding value for Switzerland in 2005 was 5.2%. While on the
rise in Switzerland, unaccompanied combined freight tonnage has been falling in the
French Alpes from 8.6% in 2000 to 5.9% in 2005, and this even while observing a
decrease in total freight tonnage.24
Based on our analysis, the construction of a new high quality infrastructure may
only be one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented policy toolbox. For the French
Alpine corridor, more direct and committed intervention based on a variety of policy
measures as observed in Switzerland may open a more fruitful path to the political
goal of increasing modal shift towards rail.
22Time and monetary costs certainly remain the most important.
23http://www.nouvelletraverseedespyrenees.com/historique.html
24Bundesamt fu¨r Verkehr (2006)
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Appendix A: Data
A.1 Supply side
In order to characterize the alternatives and accurately assess freight carriers’ costs and
posted prices, we conducted several phone interviews and gathered all available (to us)
information.
However, we cannot directly observe marginal cost. We collected data on costs and
prices of infrastructure use, and on fuel consumption to approximate them. These compo-
nents are short-run cost variables. That is why we deliberately leave aside personnel costs
which correspond to long-run costs. This choice of components seems all the more reason-
able that our cost values are very close to the ones computed and published by the Comite´
National Routier, on an annual basis.25 We explain our approximations and computations
in Appendix B. In what follows we detail our price and marginal cost approximations on
each market.
A.1.1 Prices, costs, and characteristics for the short-distance market
Table 7: Prices and Marginal Cost, Lyon - Turin, 24t load (in Euros)
MC Price
Road Mont-Blanc 365 475
Road Frejus 331 489
Road Montgenevre 126 383
Road Vintimille 290 600
Rail Mont-Cenis 216 343
Rail New transalpine link 216 reported after simulation
25http://www.cnr.fr/grilles couts/e-docs/00/00/00/26/document grille cout.phtml
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Table 7 shows collected prices and computed marginal cost for each passage and mode.
Table 8 presents the above-described quality components of the 5 existing alternatives as
well as the new transalpine link. Travel times in hours are calculated based on speed,
distance and stopping periods.
Table 8: Alternative characteristics between Lyon and Turin
Altitude Punctuality Travel Time Capacity
Road Mont-Blanc 1328 0.87 6 24
Road Frejus 1158 0.89 4 24
Road Montgenevre 1860 0.52 6 24
Road Vintimille 9 0.97 21 24
Rail Mont-Cenis 1158 0.77 11.60 60
Rail New transalpine link 478 0.80 7.60 60
A.1.2 Prices, costs, and characteristics for the transit market between
Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia
Table 9 shows prices and marginal cost for each product on the Ile-de-France-Nord-
Lombardia transit market. Given their significant market shares, we include two Swiss
alternatives on this North-South freight market: Gotthard-rail and Gotthard-road.
Table 9: Prices and Marginal Cost, Ile-de-France-Nord - Lombardia, 24t load (in
Euros)
MC Price
Road Gotthard 348 1085
Road Mont-Blanc 553.5 1056
Road Frejus 564.5 1093
Road Montgenevre 357 1114
Road Vintimille 479 1493
Rail Mont-Cenis 518 920
Rail Gotthard 515 913
Rail New transalpine link 518 reported after simulation
In Table 10, we observe that the Swiss alternatives are competitive in terms of travel
time and punctuality. This is as expected, of course, as we are looking at North-South
transit. Intuitively, we would suggest that location matters most for the attractiveness of
transport infrastructure.
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Table 10: Alternative characteristics between Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia
Altitude Punctuality Travel Time Capacity
Road Gotthard 1150 0.98 23 24
Road Mont-Blanc 1328 0.94 23 24
Road Frejus 1158 0.96 23 24
Road Montgenevre 1860 0.83 25 24
Road Vintimille 9 0.98 28 24
Rail Mont-Cenis 1158 0.77 28 60
Rail Gotthard 1150 0.79 28 60
Rail New transalpine link 478 0.80 24 60
A.1.3 Prices, costs, and characteristics for the transit market between
Spain and Lombardia
For values on the transit market we use “geographic averages”, that is we compute price
and cost values for the O-D relationship Madrid — Lombardia (North of Italy) as a proxy.
This is a simplification we need to make given our modeling framework but we argue that
these averages will be informative nonetheless. A more complex analysis with far better
data would be required to model intra-European transit in significantly more detail. Table
11 shows prices and marginal cost for each passage and mode in Spain-Italy transit.
Table 11: Prices and Marginal Cost, Spain - Lombardia, 24t load (in Euros)
MC Price
Road Frejus 832 1926
Road Montgen6`12 586 1910
Road Vintimille 606 1891
Rail Mont-Cenis 913 1351
Rail Vintimille 897 1351
Rail New transalpine link 913 reported after simulation
Table 12 presents the quality components of the 6 existing alternatives as well as the
new transalpine link.
A.2 Demand side
Within our random utility framework and to best assess the benefits from the planned
Lyon-Turin new link, individual level data would be needed. This kind of micro-level data
can be produced through expensive and time-consuming surveys that are not feasible
in the scope of this paper. We therefore choose to use the inversion method proposed
by Berry (1994). This methodology requires aggregated data, such as market shares
and information on prices, along with some quality variables within the discrete choice
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Table 12: Alternative characteristics between Spain and Lombardia
Altitude Punctuality Travel Time Capacity
Road Mont-Blanc 1328 0.97 44 24
Road Frejus 1158 0.97 43 24
Road Montgenevre 1860 0.91 43 24
Road Vintimille 9 0.99 42.5 24
Rail Mont-Cenis 1158 0.77 49 60
Rail Vintimille 9 0.77 48 60
Rail New transalpine link 478 0.80 45 60
framework. Applying this method on the O-D pair Lyon-Turin we follow Ivaldi and Vibes
(2008) and look for market shares of passages on this particular link.
For all three markets, we obtain market shares based on tons transported on each
alpine passage from the Cross-Alpine Freight Transport (CAFT) survey 2004. Austrian,
French, and Swiss authorities interview a representative sample of all Alp-crossing traffic
every 5 years. In the CAFT survey, information on the origin, destination, alpine passage,
transport mode, weight, etc. is collected. Table 13 illustrates market shares for traffic
between Lyon and Turin which accounts for 4.6% of total freight traffic crossing the French-
Italian Alpine corridor in 2004.
Table 13: Freight shares between Lyon and Turin, 2004
Passage Market Share
Road Mont-Blanc 8.2 %
Road Frejus 67,5 %
Road Montgenevre 1.6 %
Road Vintimille 0.5 %
Rail Mont-Cenis 22.2 %
Table 14 illustrates these shares for the freight transit traffic between regions Ile-de-
France-Nord and Lombardia. This traffic amounts to 1.6% of total freight traffic crossing
the Western alpine corridor in 2004.
Table 15 presents the passages’ shares for transit traffic between Spain and Lombardia.
This market accounts for 6.4% of all traffic crossing the French-Italian Alpine corridor in
2004. On this O-D relation, the Vintimille-road product clearly dominates the market.
Strikingly enough are the comparable shares of both rail products: Mont-Cenis-rail cap-
tures a market share almost as large as the one of its Vintimille-rail group-competing
product. Therefore, a new and better performing rail link close to the geographical loca-
tion of the Mont-Cenis tunnel may be able to capture some market share.
The markets in our analysis cover 12.6% of total freight traffic reported in the CAFT
2004 database. One may be tempted to question the relevance of these markets or their
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Table 14: Freight shares between Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia, 2004
Passage Market Share
Road Gotthard 5.9%
Road Mont-Blanc 40.7%
Road Frejus 40.8%
Road Montgenevre 0.4%
Road Vintimille 0.9%
Rail Mont-Cenis 9.3%
Rail Gotthard 2.0%
Table 15: Freight shares between Spain and Lombardia, 2004
Passage Market Share
Road Frejus 0.90 %
Road Montgenevre 0.04 %
Road Vintimille 98.56 %
Rail Mont-Cenis 0.24 %
Rail Vintimille 0.26 %
ability to capture representative behavior by consumers. As pointed out before, geographic
features of one “product” are crucial to its competitiveness. The new rail link explicitly
targets North-South freight traffic and aims at diverting it from other Alpine paths. The
ex ante traffic size, on this peculiar market, is not relevant for the new rail to prove
attractive or not. Moreover, we do account for market size, and its likely extension, via
the outside option.
Appendix B: Cost and Price Approximations
B.3 Marginal costs - Road
For trucks, marginal costs include costs of infrastructure use, such as road and tunnel fees,
and fuel costs. The former are available from infrastructure operators, that is highway and
tunnel operators. We take fuel consumption values given by an online route planner.26
Using the per liter price for truck diesel in June 2004 of 0.87 cents, we compute fuel costs
26http://www.autoroutes.fr
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on each passage.
B.4 Prices - Road
Pricing in truck freight is mainly done according to the type of carried goods, weight and
distance. These components obviously leave room for price discrimination that we cannot
take into account in this study. We use prices generated by a pricing tool used by a typical
road freight carrier and obtained via telephone interviews with road freight companies.
For more precise results, a more sophisticated - but less tractable - price behavior, for
example non-linear pricing, should be adopted.
B.5 Marginal Costs - Rail
In rail transport, marginal costs are also given by the costs of infrastructure use and fuel
consumption. Data on infrastructure charges can be found either at RFF that manages and
operates the French rail network, or, at the European level, at the EICIS Portal.27 Energy
consumption of a standard locomotive pulling a standard train of 800 tons28 is considered
here. We also account for the higher energy consumption on tracks that exhibit steeper
slopes. As we were not able to extract values on operational costs of freight trains from
several interviews with large rail freight companies, we have to use rather hypothetical
values here. Again, knowing exact marginal cost values could enhance the quality of our
results. Furthermore, there obviously exists a remarkable degree of heterogeneity in train
technologies, train sizes and weights that we leave aside in this study for the sake of
simplicity and tractability.
B.6 Prices - Rail
For rail prices, we take tariffs for a 24t shipment on a standard 4-axle train wagon with a
capacity of 60t on the distance of the existing rail link from SNCF’s freight tariff scheme.29
From an interview with a representative of a large European freight carrier we know,
however, that actual prices usually lie about 15% below these tariffs, due to the possibility
of negotiation, quantity discounts and else.
27http:// www.eicis.com
28Christen et al. (2004)
29http://fret.sncf.com/fr/espclnt/ncc/index.asp
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Appendix C: Simulation of the Entry of a New
Transport Link
Once the model is calibrated we can proceed to the simulation of the entry of a new
alternative. Since we know the new alternative’s quality characteristics and have previ-
ously derived the coefficients of quality components in the quality index we obtain the
quality index for the new alternatives and therefore Vj . Next, we need to recover freight
carriers’ pricing behavior when a new competitor arrives. We do this using the pricing
Equation 9 and the following expressions for the alternatives’ market shares that incorpo-
rate the quality index in the nested logit setting (see Clerides, 2008, or Trajtenberg, 1989):
First, define:
Dg =
∑
j∈Jg
e
Vj
1−σ (C.1)
Then, we obtain:
Intra-group market share:
sj/g =
e
Vj
1−σ
Dg
(C.2)
Group market share:
sg =
D
(1−σ)
g∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
(C.3)
Total market share:
sj = sj/g sg =
e
Vj
1−σ
Dσg
[∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
] (C.4)
Share of the Outside good:
s0 =
1∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
(C.5)
We solve Equation 9 for the new price vector p and obtain the new market shares using the
above expressions, which is straight forward. Disposing of prices and mean utility values
after the introduction of new alternatives we can furthermore compare the net consumer
surplus the decision maker faces before and after the introduction of a new alternative.
We take the expression in Ivaldi and Verboven (2001):
CS =
1
α
ln
 G∑
g=1
D(1−σ)g
 (C.6)
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Chapter 2
Consumer Welfare and
Unobserved Heterogeneity in
Discrete Choice Models: The
Value of Alpine Road Tunnels
joint with Daniel Cerquera
1 Introduction
In devising informed policy measures, reliable estimates of welfare implications for
the affected individuals and firms are crucial. Measuring consumer surplus in the
discrete choice framework (see McFadden, 1973), for example from changes in choice
sets or in product characteristics, goes back to Small and Rosen (1981), who derive
the Hicksian compensating variation in discrete choice models. Prominent examples
of estimating welfare implications using this framework are Trajtenberg (1989), on
the introduction of CT scanners, Goolsbee and Petrin (2002), on Satellite TV in the
US, and Petrin (2004), on the introduction of the Minivan in the US automotive
market. Much progress has been made in identifying and providing flexible ways of
modeling unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The workhorse model is the random
coefficients, or mixed, multinomial logit model introduced by Boyd and Mellman
(1980) and Cardell and Dunbar (1980). The model can approximate any random
utility model arbitrarily well, as shown by McFadden and Train (2000), if the re-
searcher knows the correct distribution of random coefficients a priori. Just as the
above examples, most applied work has imposed parametric distributions on the
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coefficients over which individuals are assumed to differ. Standard choices of dis-
tributions are the normal and the log-normal distribution. The main reasons for
their tremendous success have been computational tractability, flexibility, and the
convenient incorporation of instrumental variables by using the method of simulated
moments.
In this paper, we provide insights into the impact of distributional assumptions
in modeling unobserved heterogeneity on estimates of a welfare measure. If the re-
searcher aims to estimate consumer surplus, we expect an adequate representation
of the true underlying taste distribution to be important. To investigate this expec-
tation further, we consider alternative distributional assumptions in a transalpine
route choice setup. We employ revealed preference data from a large-scale transport
survey in 2004 and analyze the implications of a transport policy measure which
has been debated in recent years: the closure of the Mont Blanc tunnel to freight
traffic. In particular, we consider the choice of road tunnels by transalpine freight
traffic, where individual decision makers face a set of mutually exclusive options. We
proceed by estimating three discrete choice model specifications. First, the simple
fixed coeffient logit model. Second, the parametric random coefficients logit model.
Third, a nonparametric estimator of preference distributions recently proposed by
Bajari et al. (2007, 2010), henceforth BFKR. For each specification, we estimate
the loss in consumer surplus caused by a change in choice sets and compare the re-
sults. To our knowledge, we are the first to apply the BFKR estimator to real-world
data in a random coefficients logit setting. Many applications have estimated wel-
fare effects but we are not aware of many studies exploring the role of unobserved
heterogeneity in this context. A notable exception are Hynes et al. (2008), who
compare welfare implications of a random coefficients logit model and a latent class
model of kayakers’ destination choices of whitewater sites in Ireland. They find no
significant differences in welfare results from both models.
The Alps are Europe’s highest and most extensive mountain range running from
Mediterranean France to southern Austria. With its extreme geography, the alpine
region not only forms a natural frontier between Italy and central Europe, but
provides the unique gateway for ground transport between south-eastern European
regions (and beyond) and central and northern Europe. Due to the limited number of
crossing points, the Alps are a natural bottleneck at the core of European economic
activity. After the introduction of the European single market, the opening of
eastern Europe and the corresponding enlargement of commercial relations within
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), transalpine freight traffic has become
not only an important topic in European politics but a key component of transport
infrastructure planning. Mountainous road infrastructure exhibits elevated risks for
its users, among others, due to its reliance on long underground passages. Tragic
displays of this fact have been the accidents in the Mont Blanc tunnel in 1999,
the Tauern tunnel in 1999, the Gotthard tunnel in 2001, and the Frejus tunnel in
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2005. The most severe of these four accidents, in the Mont Blanc tunnel, cost 39
lives and lead to a full closure of the tunnel for three years. These events have
brought about policy initiatives in various forms. For the alpine regions, additional
investment in security measures at tunnels and formulating the objective of shifting
freight to rail and maritime transport have been particular examples.1 Proposed
safety measures have reached as far as the closure of certain road tunnels to freight
traffic.2 Quantifying the short-term monetary loss incurred by the freight transport
sector from the closure of a given tunnel is of interest to inform policy decisions
for two main reasons. First, quantifying the monetary consequences of a potential
closure for its users are at the core of any cost-benefit analysis. Second, the burden
caused by unintended closures due to accidents must be known when assessing the
monetary benefits of investment in safety measures. There are few studies evaluating
the accidental or deliberate closure of transport infrastructure. One exception are
Bilotkach et al. (2009) who exploit the collapse of a freeway interchange in the San
Francisco Bay Area to analyze sensitivity of pricing behavior to demand shocks. In
practice, removing transport infrastructure is not as exotic a discussion as one may
think. A recent debate has been ignited by the potential closure of an Expressway
in the Bronx in New York City (see Dolnick, 2010).
To investigate the impact of distributional assumptions on welfare implications,
we estimate the monetary relevance of alpine road infrastructure to road freight
crossing the Western Alpine corridor. In particular, we estimate the monetary loss
incurred by the freight transport sector due to a hypothetical closure of the Mont
Blanc tunnel. We analyze a hypothetical closure since we cannot use the actual
exogenous event in 1999 for identification as point in time information is lacking
in the data. Our welfare analysis should be seen in a narrow sense. Total welfare
encompasses not only direct changes in consumer surplus but also changes in ex-
ternal effects, e.g. caused by congestion or nuisances to other travelers, as well as
macroeconomic variables such as regional development or trade. Particularly in the
alpine regions, estimating the total social cost would need to include both the direct
costs to users (changes in consumer surplus) and external effects on non-freight users
(congestion, for example) and non-users of the infrastructure such as inhabitants of
the respective alpine valleys. The monetary cost of injuries, property damage and
business interruption should be more directly quantifiable while macro-economic ef-
fects on economic activity and trade are difficult to identify. Here we focus on direct
short-term effects likely to be central to the current political discussion.
We find that both parametric assumptions and the dimensionality of modeled
unobserved heterogeneity have a significant impact on welfare results. Our BFKR
estimates predict economically significantly higher annual losses in user surplus due
1See, for example, European Commission (2001, 2006) and Andrews (2001).
2See European Parliament (2001), and articles in the LA times (http://articles.latimes.com/
2002/mar/10/news/mn-32111) and the BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1863245.stm).
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to the Mont Blanc tunnel closure. While the latter implies a loss of e5.39 Mio, the
parametric random coefficients logit model predicts a loss of e2.97 Mio in specifi-
cations where both price and time are assumed to have random coefficients. With
one random coefficient, the BFKR estimate is almost double that of the parametric
random coefficients logit estimate, e7.09 Mio versus e3.62 Mio. Compared to both
the fixed coefficients logit and the BFKR estimates, both parametric random coef-
ficient specifications underestimate the loss in consumer surplus. We caution the
exclusive use of standard distributional assumptions in modeling heterogeneity and
demonstrate the simple implementation of the BFKR estimator.
The next section presents our data on freight traffic in the alpine region. Section
3 presents the empirical framework and discusses distributional assumptions and
identification. We present our estimation results in Section 4, discuss the implied
substitution pattern and welfare results in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2 Alpine Freight Traffic
Our data is a large-scale cross-section from the Cross-Alpine Freight Transport
(CAFT) survey done every 5 years.3 Each respective year, trucks are stopped and
surveyed at all possible Alpine crossings between Vintimille and Wechsel (see Figure
2). The survey is a joint initiative by the Austrian, French, and Swiss governments
to produce a representative sample of transalpine freight transport. In 2004, Ger-
many and Italy joined the effort emphasizing the political relevance of collecting
high quality data on transalpine transport activity. The data set comprises detailed
information on each truck’s origin and destination regions. Regions are defined at
the NUTS3 level, corresponding, for example, to departments in France, districts
in Germany, counties in the US. The data further include transported commodity
classes, weight, vehicle characteristics, region of registration, intermediary boarder
crossings, traffic direction, and more. We merge this data with shortest distances on
a direct line, data on average gas and other operating costs, road and tunnel tolls,
as well as with GDP data on origin and destination regions.4 Our sample includes
all French-Italian passages and all Swiss-Italian passages (see Appendix and Figure
2).
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics of our variables. We compute price
3The available waves are 1994, 1999, and 2004 with data quality increasing in each wave.
4We also collected data on daily weather conditions during the sample period. Unfortunately,
only the French part of the sample includes observation dates and we cannot use this information.
Since mainly small and high-altitude passes are negatively affected by weather, we expect the route
fixed effects to capture weather effects. To some extent, we expect the same with respect to traffic
volume and congestion, even though traffic data provided by the German automobile club (ADAC)
does not show significant traffic jams during the sample period.
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Table 1: Alternative-specific characteristics
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Alternative characteristics
Price 362.7 148.1
Distance 853.2 413.5
Time 18.4 11.6
User (truck) characteristics
Weight of goods (tons) 12.8 8.8
Per capita GDP at destination 30,788.1 11,299.7
Notes: The CAFT 2004 survey includes 285,656 observations
and 35,707 choice situations on French and Swiss passages.
based on an average per kilometer cost estimated by the French Comite´ National
Routier on an annual basis5 and Alpine tunnel fees. For Swiss passages, we include
the Heavy Vehicle Fee which is based on ton-kilometers in Switzerland. We com-
pute distance in kilometers from origin to destination regions via each respective
Alpine passage using Vincenty direct geographic distance calculations implemented
in Stata. We also make use of information on which border-crossings were used
along the way.6 Prato (2009) provides an up-to-date survey on the challenges in
working with route choice data and emphasizes that using shortest point-to-point
distances increases similarity within the choice set. Thus, we expect substitutability
to be over-estimated and our consumer surplus estimates to be lower bounds. We
observe that the large majority of trucks choose the alternative with the minimal
price and time. This is intuitive and we therefore expect a negative impact of these
variables on choice probabilities in our estimation results. We do observe, however,
that a small proportion does not choose the price- and time-minimizing alterna-
tive. We can think of two main reasons for this observation. First, there may be a
trade-off between time and price logistics firms face and there are some who prefer
a longer route to incurring the significant tunnel fees. Second, it could be the re-
sult of unobserved heterogeneity related to logistic route choice. In order to reduce
fixed costs, logistic firms may choose to combine several loads into one truck. As
a consequence, some observations may not be pure Origin-Destination relationships
but only the start and end points of a more complex delivery route. Furthermore,
5See http://www.cnr.fr/grilles couts/e-docs/00/00/00/26/document grille cout.phtml.
6Our attempts to obtain shortest-link route distances from routing service providers such as
Google Maps or Navteq failed, unfortunately. Thus, while we have a decent long-distance ap-
proximation based on manual checks on a small sub-sample of routes, we need to assume that no
significant bias results from ignoring the fact that roads are not straight lines.
Chapter 2: Consumer Welfare and Heterogeneity in Discrete Choice Models 40
depending on the specific good and, for example, their service contract, we expect
trucks to have (unobserved) heterogenous preferences for saving money and time.
Our time variable is based on typical truck speed and including regular compulsory
stops by European law, conditional on the number of drivers per truck. We include
per capita GDP of the destination region as a user characteristic to proxy for the
value of a vehicle’s charge, in addition to the type of commodity. The mean in our
sample is closest to per capita GDP in the Netherlands in 2004.
Figure 1: The Alpine corridor. Source: AlpInfo, Federal Office of Transport, Swiss
Confederation.
3 Empirical Framework
We estimate the loss in user surplus from a hypothetical closure of a major
transalpine road tunnel. For example, consider the problem faced by a firm lo-
cated north of the Alps - say, in France - delivering its product to a downstream
producer located south of the Alps - say, in Italy. By our definition, the firm faces
eight mutually exclusive route options. While rail could be an option for the firm,
we restrict our analysis to road freight. Even though we are forced to this restriction
by our data,7 modal choice typically depends heavily on the type of commodities
7For the same reason, our analysis is short-term in that we employ a static choice model and
do not allow for market growth or decline through an outside option.
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and logistic specificities and is, thus, largely predetermined in our choice situations.
We further motivate excluding modal choice for our setup in Section 3.3.
We adopt a discrete choice framework8 where the choice set are eight west-alpine
crossings and the decision makers are individual freight trucks. In particular, user
i maximizes the benefit to be obtained from a delivery trip through the Alps and
faces j mutually exclusive routes. Thus, the objective function is
Uij = αi(ri − pi,j) + xi,jβi + ξj + ij, (1)
where ri is the firm’s revenue from the transaction, pi,j the price for alterna-
tive j and xi,j route characteristics, which both may contain interaction terms with
individual characteristics, ξj is a constant unobserved route characteristic, and ij
is assumed to be independently and identically type I extreme value distributed.
We have detailed user-specific information, such as GDP in destination and origin
regions, commodity class, goods weight, vehicle type, location of vehicle ownership,
and so on, allowing us to control for a range of observed user characteristics. How-
ever, we expect there are still user characteristics we cannot observe, such as en
route pick-ups of goods, truck drivers’ personal tastes, or special logistic needs that
favor one route over another. It is common practice to model such unobserved
heterogeneity by assuming parametric distributions for the relevant taste parame-
ters. However, when estimating welfare measures, too strict assumptions will lead
to biased results. Cherchi and Polak (2005) warn that assuming common mixing
distributions such as the normal and log-normal may bias welfare estimations due to
an inadequate representation of the true underlying distribution of tastes. Hensher
and Greene (2003) give similar warnings and offer a range of simple ways for inves-
tigating sensible distributional assumptions.9 BFKR propose a mixtures estimator
that is nonparametric in the distribution of random coefficients. We have no good
prior as to how our taste parameters should be distributed. We further would like
to avoid assuming distributions that force portions of decision makers to have neg-
ative and unreasonably large coefficients, such as the normal distribution. Hence,
we estimate both parametric and nonparametric specifications10 and compare the
welfare results.
8See Train (2009), McFadden and Train (2000), and Hensher and Green (2003) for in-depth
treatments.
9One straight-forward proposition is a jack-knife approach where the researcher estimates fixed
coefficient logit models on sub-samples and evaluates the distributions of estimated coefficients
expected to have a non-degenerate distribution.
10We also coded the EM algorithm proposed by Train (2008) but encountered severe convergence
problems, a common problem with EM algorithms. Fosgerau and Hess (2009) use the method of
sieves to increase flexibility. They investigate the ability to recover taste distributions using two
flexible approaches: In the first, they add a series expansion to a continuous base distribution using
Legendre Polynomials. In the second, they employ discrete mixtures of normal distributions.
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3.1 Parametric Specification
We first model user heterogeneity such that taste parameters take the following
form: (
αi
βi
)
=
(
α
β
)
+ ΠDi + Σνi
where
νi ∼ N(0, I) (2)
and Di is a vector of user specific characteristics in our data. User i chooses route
j if and only if U(Di, νi, pi,j, xi,j, ξj; θ) ≥ U(Di, νi, pi,l, xi,l, ξl; θ) for l = 1, ..., J . The
individual choice probability for route j follows:
Pij =
∫
θ
exp(xi,jβi − pi,jαi + ξj)∑
l exp(xi,lβi − pi,lαi + ξl)
f(α)f(β)d(α)d(β) (3)
where we assume f(α) and f(β) to be normal distributions as defined in Equa-
tion 2. We estimate the parameters θ by maximum simulated likelihood. In the
multinomial logit with fixed coefficients, α and β are constant across individuals so
that the index i is dropped.
3.2 Nonparametric Specification
BFKR propose a general nonparametric sieve estimator of unobserved heterogeneity
in a wide range of economic models. Their motivating example for the random
coefficients logit model lends directly to our analysis. The idea is that the researcher
has some prior over the dimensionality and range of random coefficients, that is,
of unobserved heterogeneity in the utility function. Assume there are r = 1, ..., R
preference types in the population. We then specify a grid over the assumed support
of random coefficients β. At each grid point, that is for each type r, we compute
the predicted logit choice probabilities at xi,j
gj(xi,j, β
r) =
exp
(
x′i,jβ
r
)∑J
j=1 exp
(
x′i,jβr
) .
Treating these predicted probabilities as data, a simple linear regression with R
predicted choice probabilities as regressors yields estimates of R weights. The left-
hand side variable in this regression, yi,j, holds the observed choices. The estimated
weights are probability mass points representing the probability of observing type
r in the population. Constraining probability masses to the unit interval and their
sum to be equal to one, we obtain a discrete approximation to the true distribution of
random coefficients. The resulting implementation is a linear inequality constrained
OLS estimator.
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One drawback of this simple model is the researcher’s need to specify the support
region where the random coefficients lie. If the latter is unknown, BFKR propose a
location scale model that allows to both estimate the location of the support region
and its scale. We have no good prior of the support region and thus proceed with
the location scale model. A further practical advantage of the latter is the straight-
forward inclusion of fixed coefficients. This is an open issue in the linear estimator,
given that, by definition, fixed coefficients are nonlinear parameters in the logit
model. The nonlinear estimator solves the constrained least squares problem
min
a,b,θ
1
NJ
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(
yi,j −
R∑
r=1
θrgj(xi,j, a+ bβ
r)
)2
subject to
R∑
r=1
θr = 1 and θr ≥ 0,
(4)
where a = (a1, ..., aK)
′ is a set of location parameters, b = (b1, ..., bK) a set of scale
parameters, θr the weight for the parameter vector βr = (βr1 , ..., β
r
K) , and
gj(xi,j, a+ bβ
r) =
exp
(∑K
k=1 xk,i,j(ak + bkβ
r
k)
)
∑J
j=1 exp
(∑K
k=1 xk,i,j(ak + bkβ
r
k)
) .
We estimate scale parameters bK for random coefficients and set bK = 0 for
coefficients assumed to be fixed. We could allow all coefficients to be random but,
as common with nonparametric estimators, we reach computational limits fast when
increasing the number of random coefficients. Having reasonable starting values is
important in nonlinear least squares estimation. We use the fixed coefficient logit
estimates for the nonlinear parameters and 1
R
for θr. Experimenting with starting
values of the nonlinear parameters, we find our results are very robust to large
variations in starting values. We still need to specify R grid points in the unit
interval. To do so, we use the Modified Latin Hypercube Sampling method proposed
by Hess et al. (2006). Compared to Halton methods, the latter has the advantage
of avoiding undesired correlation patterns across dimensions while providing more
uniform coverage in each dimension, and being simpler to implement.
3.3 Identification
Given their regulated nature, tolls for individual tunnels and long-distance routes
vary little across time and routes. Thus, to identify demand patterns, we use
individual-level variation from users’ geographic dispersion across Europe. In par-
ticular, users’ origin and destination locations vary relative to the locations of alpine
passages. This leads to variation both in route characteristics and individual choices.
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As road and tunnel tolls are not set strategically, we are confident they are not cor-
related with the error term. There are two factors that may affect both route choice
and travel time. First, congestion may cause short-term deviation to an alternative
route. On French passages, however, congestion is not a relevant problem. The
Alpine Traffic Observatory, established by the European Commission and the Swiss
government in 2007, finds that the Frejus and Mont Blanc tunnels rarely suffer from
congestion due to heavy-duty vehicles.11 Second, severe weather conditions may
cause deviation to alternative routes while increasing travel time. Unfortunately,
we cannot fully correct for this potential problem as only parts of our data have
information on the date of the choice situation.12 Once we are willing to assume
that truck drivers form long-term expectations on potential obstacles for each route
alternative,13 we argue it is plausible to believe that the alternative fixed effects will
capture much, if not all, potential bias.
Implicitly, we assume that we observe each individual’s entire choice set and
that there is no outside good. While in the long run freight expeditors may switch
to other modes such as air, rail, and sea or even decide not to ship, in the short
run this is very unlikely. In the first two columns of Table 4, showing market
shares of alternatives before and after the Mont Blanc tunnel closure in 1999, we
cannot observe a remarkable shift in market shares towards any of the three rail
passages in the short-run.14 We also do not observe a downward shift in monthly
tons transported after the closure, suggesting that traffic fully deviated to alternative
road passages. We interpret this as evidence that modal shift is not yet as relevant
as it may be elsewhere. That interpretation is in line with anecdotal evidence on
freight transport in France and Italy, citing specific logistic needs, the importance of
geographical location, and freight terminals being major bottlenecks as just a few of
many remaining problems preventing increased modal shift.15 While an important
issue in general, we conclude that observing only one mode is a minor drawback in
our analysis.
Bajari et al. (2009) prove nonparametric identification of the distribution of
random coefficients by exploiting the logit distributional assumptions on ij and
without relying on large support (as compared to, for example, Berry and Haile,
2010) and monotonicity restrictions. The latter makes their identification result
particularly relevant for applied work. A limitation is that their proof is valid only
for continuous regressors. Both regressors, for which we assume random coefficients,
11See, for example, the Observatory’s executive summary, page 6, at http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/road/doc/executive summary alpine observatory en.pdf.
12We did collect daily weather data for the different passages but were unable to obtain survey
dates for the Swiss part of the data. This applies to congestion data analogously.
13Deviating from a planned route is often prohibitive in terms of cost and time.
14Due to missing time information at the individual level, our data do not allow direct estimation
of the switch to rail and alternative roads caused by the Mont Blanc tunnel closure.
15See Andrews (2001), Lange and Ruffini (2007), and Peter Brett Associates LLP (2010).
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are continuous.
4 Estimation results
We report results for three models of heterogeneity. These are the simple logit, the
random coefficients logit with a normal distribution assumption, and the nonpara-
metric BFKR estimator of the random coefficient distribution.16 For conciseness,
we will refer to these as Logit, RC Logit, and BFKR, respectively. In the Logit
specification, observed heterogeneity in preferences can be identified by interacting
individual characteristics with route characteristics. Unobserved heterogeneity is
limited to the extreme value error term, which is independent of route characteris-
tics. The Logit specification serves as an easy reference point, lending well to the
investigation of a variety of utility specifications, and provides reasonable starting
values for the RC Logit and BFKR models. In the latter, we report two specifica-
tions with one and two random coefficients. In the RC Logit, we assume random
coefficients to be normally distributed, which is by far the most common distribu-
tion assumption in the literature employing random coefficients logit models. In
the BFKR model, we make no assumption on the form of preference distribution,
whatsoever, but assume that our discrete approximation is a valid representation of
the true distribution.
Tables 2 reports estimations results with one random coefficient, Table 3 reports
results with two. Both tables show that the estimated coefficients have signs as
expected. In particular, price and time have negative signs. The coefficients of the
interaction terms between weight of goods transported and the alternative specific
constants show that heavily loaded trucks are less likely to use Swiss passages and the
Montgenevre passage.17 This corresponds to our expectation that the Montgenevre
pass, having the highest elevation, is less attractive to heavy vehicles likely due
to increased fuel consumption and safety concerns on steep slopes. In Switzerland,
extra incentives are given for transiting heavy goods vehicles to switch to rail on their
passage through the Alps. While we account for monetary incentives by including
the extra fees in our price variable, the weight interaction terms may capture further
incentives we cannot observe in our data.
In Table 2, price coefficients are higher, in absolute terms, in the RC Logit and
BFKR specifications than in the Logit. Hence, not modeling unobserved hetero-
geneity not only fails to account for the spread of preferences but also biases the
16We run our parametric estimations using the mixlogit Stata command by Hole (2007). For
nonparametric estimations, inference, and compensating variation, Matlab code is available from
the authors on request.
17The base category both for the alternative specific constants and for the interaction term with
good weights is alternative 5, the Mediterranean passage at Vintimille.
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Table 2: Results with one random coefficient (1)
Logit
RC Logit
BFKR
Mean SD
Price -8.478*** -9.298*** 1.523*** See
Figure 4
(.118) (.149) (.079)
Time -.922*** -.869*** -.854***
(.230) (.232) (.040)
Price × GDPdestination 1.153*** 1.533*** 1.096***
(.294) (.317) (.001)
Mont Blanc 4.214*** 4.291*** 3.969***
(.280) (.297) (.243)
×Weight .008 .010 .014***
(.006) (.006) (.001)
Frejus 5.144*** 5.256*** 4.488***
(.234) (.254) (.318)
×Weight .020*** .023*** .026***
(.005) (.006) (.002)
Montgenevre -5.843*** -6.657*** -4.886***
(.552) (.657) (.291)
×Weight -.031*** -.036*** -.024***
(.009) (.010) (.005)
Gd St-Bernard .154 .178 .632***
(.310) (.332) (.065)
×Weight -.058*** -.063*** -.072***
(.009) (.010) (.004)
Simplon -.095 -.113 .428***
(.310) (.330) (.089)
×Weight -.047*** -.051*** -.085***
(.010) (.010) (.004)
St. Gotthard 3.576*** 3.730*** 4.128***
(.293) (.312) (.196)
×Weight -.073*** -.076*** -.096***
(.007) (.007) (.007)
San Bernadino 2.654*** 2.789*** 3.282***
(.297) (.316) (.102)
×Weight -.073*** -.075*** -.090***
(.008) (.008) (.005)
Likelihood ratio 105342.50 130.60
Prob > χ2 .000 .000
Pseudo R2 .71
Notes: All specifications include route dummy-commodity class and time-commodity
class interaction terms as well as route dummies interacted with dummies indicating
traffic connecting Italy with regions west and north of the Alps, respectively. The refer-
ence route is the Mediterranean crossing at Vintimille. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis, choice situation-clustered robust standard errors in BFKR estimation. 500
Halton draws used for simulations in parametric random coefficients logit estimations.
285,656 observations.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
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estimated means. The means and standard deviations of the price coefficient are sig-
nificant in both random coefficient specifications. Figure 4 shows a decent Gaussian
shape, confirming our parametric distribution assumption in the RC Logit. Hence,
we can be reasonably confident that unobserved heterogeneity with respect to price
plays an important role in our freight transport setting. In Table 3, we allow in-
dividuals to have heterogenous (and potentially correlated) preferences over both
price and time. Interpreting the RC Logit result, where the standard deviation of
the time coefficient is not statistically different from zero, we conclude the estimated
distribution to be degenerate. In economic terms, we may be tempted to conclude
that there is no unobserved heterogeneity in preferences over time. Observing the
BFKR estimates in Figure 4, however, we clearly see significant heterogeneity both
in preferences over price and time. A priori, it is not obvious which distribution to
assume. It is difficult to proceed in an ad-hoc fashion by assuming various readily
available parametric distributions and using the ones yielding significant parameters
estimates. There is no clear rule which and how many parametric distributions to
investigate before ‘giving up’ and coming to the conclusion that here may be no
unobserved heterogeneity in the data.
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Figure 2: Distribution of price coefficient from BFKR estimation in Table 2.
Regimes R=274.
The main assumption in BFKR is that their sieve estimator is a discrete ap-
proximation of the true distribution. Therefore, the number of grid points is a key
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Table 3: Results with two correlated random coefficients (2)
Logit
RC Logit
BFKR
Mean SD
Price -8.478*** -9.244*** 1.273***
See
Figure 4
(.118) (.148) (.078)
Time -.922*** -1.504*** .271
(.230) (.266) (.291)
Price × GDPdestination 1.153*** 1.520*** 1.160***
(.294) (.322) (.001)
Mont Blanc 4.214*** 4.276*** 5.913***
(.280) (.293) (.316)
×Weight .008 .010* .018***
(.006) (.006) (.002)
Frejus 5.144*** 5.254*** 6.753***
(.234) (.248) (.403)
×Weight .020*** .023*** .032***
(.005) (.005) (.003)
Montgenevre -5.843*** -6.638*** -5.318***
(.552) (.665) (.319)
×Weight -.031*** -.035*** -.013***
(.009) (.010) (.003)
Gd St-Bernard .154 .237 1.553***
(.310) (.332) (.067)
×Weight -.058*** -.065*** -.071***
(.009) (.010) (.004)
Simplon -.095 -.064 1.485***
(.310) (.330) (.089)
×Weight -.047*** -.053*** -.092***
(.010) (.011) (.004)
St. Gotthard 3.576*** 3.818*** 5.434***
(.293) (.310) (.225)
×Weight -.073*** -.077*** -.109***
(.007) (.007) (.008)
San Bernadino 2.654*** 2.872*** 4.509***
(.297) (.314) (.115)
×Weight -.073*** -.076*** -.102***
(.008) (.008) (.006)
Likelihood ratio 105342.50 262.77
Prob > χ2 .000 .000
Pseudo R2 .71
Notes: All specifications include route dummy-commodity class and time-commodity
class interaction terms as well as route dummies interacted with dummies indicating
traffic connecting Italy with regions west and north of the Alps, respectively. The refer-
ence route is the Mediterranean crossing at Vintimille. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis, choice situation-clustered robust standard errors in BFKR estimation. 500
Halton draws used for simulations in parametric random coefficients logit estimations.
285,656 observations.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 3: Distribution of price and time coefficients from BFKR estimation in
Table 3. Regimes R=256.
parameter the researcher needs to define. It is limited by sample size and com-
puter memory. With 8GB RAM and our sample size of 35,707 choice situations,
we are able to set R=274 with one and R=256 with two random coefficients, that
is R = N
130
whereas BFKR propose R = N
40
in their Monte Carlo experiment. Fur-
thermore, to use parametric methods for computing standard errors of the BFKR
estimates, we need to assume that the grid points r are the true types that generated
the data. It is obvious that, unless we can specify an almost infinite number of r,
estimated probability mass points and thus their standard errors can only be ap-
proximations to the truth. We compute 95% confidence intervals, following BFKR
and Gallant (1975), using standard errors from unconstrained nonlinear regression
and clustering by individual choice situations. Confidence intervals are then defined
as CI95 =
[
θˆr − 1.96 · SE
(
θˆrunc
)
, θˆr + 1.96 · SE
(
θˆrunc
)]
∩ [0, 1], where SE = √νˆ
and
νˆ =
NP
NP − 1
(
SSE
N − p(J
′J)−1
(
M∑
k=1
(∑
j∈Gk
u′j
∑
j∈Gk
uj
))
SSE
N − p(J
′J)−1
)
.
However, as do BFKR, we find these confidence intervals to be very conservative
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and, thus, too uninformative to report. From our experience with estimations using
varying grids sizes, this problem seems to get worse as the number of grid points R
increases and θ are estimated closer to the zero boundary. Bootstrapping is infeasible
as the nonlinear least squares routine consumes significant computing time with the
size of our sample and parameter vector.
5 Counterfactual Analysis
5.1 Diversion pattern
To verify the structural quality of our estimates, we compare counterfactual shares
with those observed after the Mont Blanc tunnel closure in 1999. Road tolls and
tunnel fees were not adjusted as a consequence of the closure and there is currently
no road congestion pricing on the relevant road network. Thus, we assume there
is no strategic pricing and prices remain fixed after a hypothetical future closure
of a tunnel. In Table 4, we present the substitution due to a hypothetical closure
of the Mont Blanc tunnel in 2004 predicted by the BFKR model with two random
coefficients. We compute market shares in the table based on tons transported.
Table 4: Passage Market Shares (%) - Counterfactual closure in 2004
1999 2004
Open Closed Open Closed
Road
Mont Blanc 21.79 10.14
Frejus 27.68 44.54 32.51 35.87
Montgenevre 1.09 3.38 0.67 2.31
Vintimille 21.26 24.36 33.76 33.31
Gd St-Bernard 1.19 1.99
Simplon 1.25 1.54
St. Gotthard 18.07 21.59
San Bernadino 2.41 3.38
Rail
Basel (CH) 10.61 10.84
Modane (Frejus) 15.42 15.21
Vintimille 2.16 1.67
Monthly tonnage (1000s) 4,455 4,619 4,038
Notes: 2004 Predictions are simulated using specification (2) of the BFKR model.
We use 1000 quasi-random draws to compute choice probabilities.
Table 4 shows that most traffic diverted to the nearby Frejus tunnel when the
Mont Blanc option dropped out in 1999. The traffic share at the Mont Blanc
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dropped from 21.79% to 0%, causing an increase of the traffic share at the Frejus
from 27.68% to 44.54%. We do not have monthly data for Swiss passages in 1999,
limiting comparison to the French passages. A further limitation arises from the fact
that, between 1999 and 2004, Switzerland gradually increased weight restrictions for
heavy duty transit. For a large share of trucks, Swiss passages were not an available
option in 1999 while, in 2004, these limitations were virtually gone. Since 1999,
freight traffic through the Mont Blanc tunnel has been reduced significantly, its
share being 10.14% in 2004. Our counterfactual results show the largest shifts from
the Mont Blanc tunnel to the Frejus and St. Gotthard passages. While 10.14%
traffic share need to be compensated by the remaining passages, the traffic share at
the Frejus is predicted to increase from 32.51% to 35.87% and at the St. Gotthard
from 18.07% to 21.59%. We interpret the similar tendencies on French passages
throughout 1999 and 2004 to confirm the fit of the BFKR model but stress the
limited comparability of these market shares due to institutional and observational
differences.
5.2 Consumer surplus
We analyze a hypothetical closure of the Mont Blanc tunnel in 2004 and compute
users’ compensating variations, that is, the amount of money one would have to
give to infrastructure users to maintain their ex ante utility levels. We define the
ex ante situation as the reference point, as suggested by Trajtenberg (1989). In
the multinomial logit model, abstracting from observed heterogeneity for notational
simplicity, computation of the compensating variation is straight forward and given
by the difference of the ex post and ex ante values of the logsum measure with no
unobserved taste heterogeneity:
CV =
1
α
{
ln
∑
j
exp
(
β′xprej
)− ln∑
j
exp
(
β′xpostj
)}
(5)
As the random coefficients logit model introduces unobserved taste heterogene-
ity, each individual now may have her own valuation of route characteristics. We
integrate over the estimated mixing distributions by simulation and compute the
mean and total compensating variation. This is where the how we model hetero-
geneity comes in. With random coefficients, any distributional assumption has a
direct impact on the consumer surplus measure which, following Train (1998) and
von Haefen (2003), we compute as:
CVi =
∫
1
αi
{
ln
∑
j
exp
(
β′xprei,j
)− ln∑
j
exp
(
β′xposti,j
)}
f (α | θpre) d(α) (6)
Equations 5 and 6 imply the assumption that the marginal utility of income, αi,
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is independent of income. That is, indirect utility is additive and linear in income.
While this is a restrictive assumption, Train (2009) points out, on page 57, that it
needs to hold only ‘over the range of implicit income changes that are considered by
the policy’. This means that if individual compensating variations are low relative to
income, which is arguably true for our case, the assumption does not need to hold
in general but only for the considered small range. Maintaining this assumption
significantly simplifies our computations. We solve Equation 6 for each individual
via simulation by sampling from the estimated mixing distributions. To obtain the
population mean and total change in user benefits, we weight the estimated sample
means of compensating variations using the expansion factor in the CAFT 2004
data.
Table 5: Welfare effects of tunnel closure
Compensating
variation
(in 2004 Euros)
Logit RC Logit BFKR
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Sample mean 1.11 .84 .69 1.80 1.39
Population mean 1.28 .96 .79 1.88 1.43
Population total (Mio) 4.83 3.62 2.97 7.09 5.39
Notes: We use 1000 quasi-random draws to solve the integral in Equation 6.
In Table 5, we report the compensating variation for closing the Mont Blanc tun-
nel as the unweighted and weighted means over the sampled individuals, and as the
weighted sum yielding the population total. The BFKR estimates imply economi-
cally significantly higher losses in user surplus. With two random coefficients, the
BFKR estimate implies a loss of e5.39 Mio and the RC Logit a loss of e2.97 Mio.
With one random coefficient, the BFKR estimate is almost double that of the RC
Logit estimate, e7.09 Mio versus e3.62 Mio. Compared to both the Logit and the
BFKR estimates, both RC Logit specifications underestimate the loss in consumer
surplus. We admit that a more informative comparison would include confidence
intervals for these estimates. These can be computed using the delta method. How-
ever, they rely on the estimated variances of θˆr. Since there is currently no method
to estimate correct confidence intervals, for the reasons elaborated in Section 4, we
are not able to provide these inference results for our welfare estimates. The large
relative differences between the RC Logit and BFKR results strongly suggest, how-
ever, that modeling unobserved heterogeneity in a more flexible way can lead to
severely differing economic conclusions.
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6 Conclusion
Estimating welfare implications of specific policy measures is relevant in many eco-
nomic applications. The discrete choice framework provides a convenient way to
estimate the compensating variation, for example for changes in choice sets or in
product characteristics, when individuals face a set of mutually exclusive choices.
It is well known, that modeling heterogeneity is key to understanding preferences
and hence to quantify consumer surplus. While the random coefficients logit model
offers a highly flexible way to approximate any random utility model arbitrarily
well, it hinges on the assumption that the researcher knows the correct distribu-
tion of random coefficients a priori. While estimating welfare effects is a common
exercise in many applications, we are not aware of many studies exploring the role
of unobserved heterogeneity in this context. We provide insights into the impor-
tance of how unobserved heterogeneity is modeled when estimating welfare effects
of policy measures. We do so by comparing consumer surplus estimates from a
recently proposed nonparametric estimator of preference distributions and the stan-
dard parametric random coefficients logit model. To our knowledge, we are the
first to apply the BFKR estimator to real-world data in a random coefficients logit
setting. Employing revealed preference data, we analyze the implications of a much
debated transport policy measure: the closure of the alpine Mont Blanc tunnel to
freight traffic.
We estimate the annual loss in user benefits ranges from 2.97 to 3.62 million Euros
in the RC Logit model, while our BFKR estimates imply annual losses ranging from
5.39 to 7.09 million Euros. Hence, in our analysis both parametric assumptions and
the dimensionality of modeled unobserved heterogeneity have a significant impact
on welfare results. We thus caution the exclusive use of standard distributional
assumptions in modeling heterogeneity and demonstrate the simple implementation
of the BFKR estimator.
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Appendix: Alpine passages
Our sample includes the following passages:
1. Mont Blanc tunnel
2. Frejus tunnel
3. Montgenevre pass
4. Vintimille expressway (along the Mediterranean coast)
5. Grand St-Bernard tunnel
6. Simplon pass
7. St. Gotthard tunnel
8. San Bernadino pass
References
Andrews, Edmund L. (2001), “Soaring Continental Trade Produces Deadly Squeeze
at Alpine Tunnels”, New York Times, 2 November.
Bajari, Patrick L., Fox, Jeremy T., and Stephen P. Ryan (2007), “Linear Regression
Estimation of Discrete Choice Models with Nonparametric Random Coefficient
Distributions,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 97(2), 459-
463.
Bajari, Patrick L., Fox, Jeremy T., il Kim, Kyoo, and Stephen P. Ryan (2009), The
Random Coefficients Logit Model Is Identified, mimeo.
Bajari, Patrick L., Fox, Jeremy T., il Kim, Kyoo, and Stephen P. Ryan (2010), A
Simple Nonparametric Estimator for the Distribution of Random Coefficients,
mimeo.
Berry, Steven T. and Philip A. Haile (2010), Nonparametric Identification of Multi-
nomial Choice Demand Models with Heterogeneous Consumers, mimeo.
Bilotkach, Volodymyr, Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Oleksandr Talavera (2009), Sen-
sitivity of Prices to Demand Shocks: A Natural Experiment in the San Francisco
Bay Area, mimeo.
Cherchi, Elisabetta and John W. Polak (2005), “Assessing User Benefits with Dis-
crete Choice Models: Implications of Specification Errors Under Random Taste
Heterogeneity,” Transportation Research Record 1926, 61-69.
Chapter 2: Consumer Welfare and Heterogeneity in Discrete Choice Models 55
Dolnick, Sam (2010), “Plan to Remove Bronx Expressway Gains Traction”, New
York Times, 12 July.
European Commission (2001), European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to decide.
White Paper, European Commission, Brussels.
European Commission (2006), Aid to Finance Safety Measures in the Mont-Blanc
Tunnel and the Maurice Lemaire Tunnel. Press Release IP/06/206, European
Commission, Brussels.
European Parliament (2001), “Reopening of Mont Blanc Tunnel”, OJ edition, De-
bate on 25 October 2001, Strasbourg.
Fosgerau, Mogens and Stephane Hess (2009), “A Comparison of Methods for Rep-
resenting Random Taste Heterogeneity in Discrete Choice Models,” European
Transport, 40, 1-25.
Gallant, A. Ronald (1975), “Nonlinear Regression,” The American Statistician 29,
73-81.
Goolsbee, Austan and Amil Petrin (2004), “The Consumer Gains from Direct Broad-
cast Satellites and the Competition with Cable TV,” Econometrica, 72(2), 351-
381.
Hensher, David A. and William H. Greene (2003), “The Mixed Logit Model: The
State of Practice,” Transportation 30(2), 133-176.
Hess, Stephane, Train, Kenneth E., John W. Polak (2006), “On the Use of a Modified
Latin Hypercube Sampling (MLHS) Method in the Estimation of a Mixed Logit
Model for Vehicle Choice,” Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 40(2),
147-163.
Hole, Arne R. (2007), “Fitting Mixed Logit Models by using Maximum Simulated
Likelihood,” The Stata Journal 7(3), 388-401.
Hynes, Stephen, Hanley, Nick, and Riccardo Scarpa (2008), “Effects on Welfare Mea-
sures of Alternative Means of Accounting for Preference Heterogeneity in Recre-
ational Demand Models,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90(4),
1011-1027.
Lange, Sandra and Flavio V. Ruffini (2007), “Transalpine Freight Transport: A Call
for Joint Measures,” Journal of Alpine Research 95(1), 21-32.
McFadden, Daniel L. (1973), Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Be-
havior. in Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Academic
Press, 105-142.
Chapter 2: Consumer Welfare and Heterogeneity in Discrete Choice Models 56
McFadden, Daniel L. and Kenneth E. Train (2000), “Mixed MNL Models for Dis-
crete Response,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 14(5), 447-470.
Peter Brett Associates LLP (2010), Freight Modal Choice Study: Behavioural Bar-
riers and Factors Influencing Modal Choice. Final Report, Department for Trans-
port, London.
Petrin, Amil (2002), “Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the
Minivan,” Journal of Political Economy, 110(4), 705-729.
Prato, Carlo G. (2009), “Route Choice Modeling: Past, Present and Future Research
Directions,” Journal of Choice Modelling, 2(1), 65-100.
Train, Kenneth E. (1998), “Recreation Demand Models with Taste Differences over
People,” Land Economics 74(2), 230-239.
Train, Kenneth E. (2009), Discrete Choice Models with Simulation, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
Train, Kenneth E. (2008), “EM Algorithms for Nonparametric Estimation of Mixing
Distributions,” Journal of Choice Modeling 1(1), 40-69.
Trajtenberg, Manuel (1989), “The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an
Application to Computed Tomography Scanners,” Journal of Political Economy
97(2), 444-479.
Von Haefen, Roger H. (2003), “Incorporating Observed Choice into the Construction
of Welfare Measures from Random Utility Models,” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 45(2), 145-165.
Chapter 3
Effort in Nomination Contests:
Evidence from Professional Soccer
joint with Jeanine Miklo´s-Thal
1 Introduction
Situations abound in which several candidates compete for a limited number of
desirable positions and selection is based on the candidates’ relative reputations.
Employees compete for promotions, given to the employee who their superior be-
lieves will be most effective in the higher-level position. Hiring decisions are based
on subjective comparisons of candidates’ skills and potentials. Political parties nom-
inate election candidates on the basis of their anticipated abilities to attract voters.
Team coaches in sports select those players for important matches who they believe
will lead their teams to victory.
While motivating employees is often an explicit goal of promotion systems, the
decision-maker’s objective in a hiring contest is usually simply to select the most able
agent.1 Irrespective of a contest’s ultimate goal, however, contest participation can
have important incentive effects. Whenever current performance affects perceived
ability, and thereby potentially also the contest outcome, actions aimed at improving
one’s performance can be profitable.
Does contest participation always motivate agents, and, when it does, what de-
termines the extent of the effect? We propose a simple theoretical model predicting
1Prendergast (1999) provides an excellent survey of incentive provision in firms. Chan (1996)
analyzes the conflict between motivating internal agents by the prospect of a promotion and se-
lecting the most promising candidate out of a pool of internal and external candidates.
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that each candidate’s effort incentive depends on his own and his rivals’ current
reputations. Candidates who have realistic chances of being selected but are not
too confident have strong incentives to exert higher than normal effort. Candidates
in very weak or very strong positions, on the other hand, do not have much to gain
from exerting additional effort, since changes in their performances are unlikely to
affect the final decision. In some contexts, higher effort also increases the risk of an
injury or leads to exhaustion. When competing for a position that requires contin-
ued fitness, candidates who are confident their reputations sufficiently exceed those
of other contestants may therefore find it optimal to exert less than normal effort.
We use readily available data from professional soccer to test these predictions.
When a nation qualifies for an international tournament, such as the Soccer Euro
Cup, the national team coach gets charged with nominating a fixed number of players
for the Cup.2 Nationality determines the set of legally eligible players and hence
whether a player participates in the nomination contest for a specific national team.
A Euro Cup participation is clearly a milestone in any player’s career.
The key feature of professional soccer that allows us to estimate the effects of
nomination contests is the coexistence of important tournaments between national
teams with international player compositions of club teams. We use a panel data set
of all players that worked for clubs in the German Soccer League (1. Bundesliga)
in the seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08. About two thirds of the players belong to
nations that took part in the Euro Cup, the most important international soccer
Cup alongside the World Cup, in summer 2008.3 This set of players will provide
the treatment group in our empirical analyses. In players from nations that did not
participate in the so-called Euro 2008 we have an exceptionally good control group,
since these players work in exactly the same environment as players from qualified
nations but did not face the additional career opportunity of the upcoming Euro
Cup. The treatment period starts on the day a player’s nation qualified for the Euro
2008.
Our data contain individual performance measures of two types. First, individual
outputs such as shots on goal, ball contacts, passes received, and the number of
minutes played. Second, performance grades assigned to players by soccer magazines
after each match.
To distinguish between players with different nomination chances, we construct
a time-varying variable that measures how frequently a player was selected for his
national team in the more recent past. Difference-in-difference-in-differences anal-
yses show that for players with intermediate chances the Euro Cup qualification
2National team compositions are flexible in friendly matches between nations or qualification
matches for international Cups, but not in international Cups.
3The Euro Cup and the World Cup take place every four years, and are always two years apart
from each other. There are some other international cups, such as the Copa America or the Africa
Cup of Nations, but these are far from being as important (in terms of media coverage, premia
paid by national teams, etc.) as the Euro and the World Cup.
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treatment had a positive impact on many performance measures. For instance, the
estimated increase in the number of passes such players receive per minute is 11%.
The empirical results also confirm that injury and exhaustion concerns matter: for
players with very high nomination chances, the impact of nomination contest partic-
ipation is negative across a variety of output measures. Moreover, for duels, which
carry a particularly high injury risk, all statistically significant effects are negative.
Consistent with the theory, we find no impact on the performances of players without
past national team appearances.
For players with intermediate chances, our study hence confirms that ” ... the
increased rivalry benefits clubs, because players exert even higher effort in their clubs
in order to get into the national team.”, as claimed by Oliver Bierhoff, manager of the
German national team (Handelsblatt, 9/4/2009).4 An upcoming Cup can be to the
detriment of clubs that employ regular players of national teams, who are highly
certain of their nominations, however. One may only speculate that statements
such as ”We want to ignite rivalry, and we want it for every position.” (stern.de,
11/8/2004) by the German national team coach Joachim Lo¨w are meant to reassure
clubs in this respect.5
Related literature We are not aware of any other empirical study of nomination
contests. There is however a sizeable literature on rank-order tournaments, in which
agents’ outputs during the tournament fully determine payoffs. An agent who starts
out as a favorite still needs to outperform all his rivals to win, while an underdog does
not face any handicap.6 Many if not most hiring and promotion decisions are instead
based on relative reputations, that is, on assessments of agents’ relative abilities
that incorporate not only recent but also past achievements and other relevant
information. In the nomination contests for soccer teams, for example, two players
who perform equally well during the nomination period will not be nominated with
equal probabilities if one of them starts out with a higher reputation than the other.
The literature on rank-order tournaments is related to our paper because the
predicted relation between an agent’s winning probability and his effort incentives
is similar. Most empirical studies of rank-order tournaments, however, focus on the
more basic question whether higher prize differentials lead to more effort. Ehrenberg
and Bognanno (1990) and Orszag (1994) provide evidence from golf tournaments,
Becker and Huselid (1992) look at auto racing, and Knoeber and Thurman (1995)
examine the impact of tournament-style contracts in the broiler industry. Garicano
4The original quote in German is ”... der gro¨ßer werdende Konkurrenzkampf bereichert auch die
Vereine, weil die Spieler sich in ihren Klubs noch mehr anstrengen, um in die Nationalmannschaft
zu kommen” (Handelsblatt, 9/4/2009).
5The original quote in German is ”Wir wollen den Konkurrenzkampf entfachen, wir wollen ihn
auf jeder Position haben.” (stern.de, 11/8/2004).
6A special case are biased tournaments (Meyer 1991, 1992) in which contestants face different
handicaps. Biased tournaments are theoretically equivalent to contests based on relative reputa-
tions in a special case only. See footnote 11 in section 2 for more details.
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and Palacios-Huerta (2006) show that higher prize differentials increase not only
creative but also destructive effort (in the form of fouls) in soccer.7
More closely related to our paper, Brown (2010) shows that superstar Tiger
Woods’ participation in golf tournaments adversely affects the performances of his
rivals. The impact is particularly strong for (higher skill) exempt players who would
have realistic winning chances in the absence of Woods. Our study differs along
several dimensions (in addition to looking at nomination contests instead of tour-
naments). By constructing a variable that measures players’ relative national team
nomination chances, we can test predictions about the impact of contest partici-
pation for players with winning chances from zero to virtually one. Brown (2010)
instead compares situations - without and with Tiger Woods - in which other exempt
players have either intermediate or low winning chances. Moreover, the institutional
characteristic that players of many different nationalities work for the same clubs
but only some nations participate in the Euro Cup allows us to test for causal ef-
fects of contest participation,8 whereas Brown (2010) and other empirical studies
compare tournaments with different features.9
Our motivating theory incorporates signal jamming, as in Holmstro¨m’s (1982)
seminal paper on career concerns, into the classic rank-order tournament model
of Lazear and Rosen (1981).10 Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka (2003) use a similar theory to
study the potential benefits of managerial turnover in revitalizing rivalry between
employees. We propose a model that is closer to the nomination contests in our em-
pirical application and focus on the equilibrium relation between individual effort
and winning chances instead. Relative reputational concerns have also been stud-
ied in theoretical models on rivalry between experts (Effinger and Polborn 2001,
Ottaviani and Sorensen 2006).
The next section develops a theory of nomination contests and derives empirical
predictions. Section 3 describes the data, our choice of output measures, and the in-
stitutional context. Section 4 explains and discusses the empirical strategy. Section
5 contains the empirical results. Section 6 offers a brief conclusion and implications
for other situations.
7Similar in spirit, Duggan and Levitt (2002) find that there is more corruption in sumo matches
in which one wrestler faces a particularly high marginal payoff from winning.
8Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2008) exploit international compositions of soccer teams to test
whether there is a connection between cultural background and violence on the field.
9Another recent related study is Franke (2010) who shows that amateur golfers perform better in
tournaments where individual scores are evaluated relative to a player’s handicap than in standard
tournaments. Sunde (2009) finds a negative correlation between the heterogeneity of opponents
and the number of games in tennis matches.
10On the theory of rank-order tournaments, see also Green and Stockey (1983), Dixit (1987),
Meyer (1992), Baik (1994), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), and the above-mentioned survey by Pren-
dergast (1999).
Chapter 3: Effort in Nomination Contests: Evidence from Professional Soccer 61
2 Theory
Suppose there are two agents (for example, two soccer players of the same nation-
ality), one of whom can be selected for an attractive post at the end of a fixed time
period. The nomination decision is taken by a principal (the national team coach)
whose objective is to select the most skillful agent. Hence, unlike in a classic rank-
order tournament a` la Lazear and Rosen (1981), it is the principal’s beliefs about
the agents’ skills that determine the winner.
We model learning about each individual agent’s skill as in Holmstro¨m (1982).
Let ηj denote agent j’s (j ∈ {1, 2}) skill level, which is assumed to be constant over
the relevant time period. At the beginning of the nomination contest, the agents and
the principal share the same prior beliefs. Specifically, we assume that the prior of ηj
follows a normal distribution with mean mj and precision (equal to the inverse of the
variance) hj > 0. The prior distributions of η1 and η2 are independent. Over time,
learning about ηj occurs through the observation of j’s performance. For simplicity,
we consider learning in a single time period, called the nomination period. Agent
j’s output in the nomination period is given by
yj = ηj + aj + εj,
where aj ∈ [0,∞) is j’s effort in the nomination period, unobservable for the prin-
cipal and agent k 6= j. εj is a stochastic noise term, and we assume that ε1 and ε2
are independently and normally distributed with zero means and precision hε > 0.
In addition, each agent faces an injury risk, modelled as an increasing func-
tion r (·) of individual effort with r (0) ≥ 0 and lima→∞ r (a) ≤ 1. The principal’s
objective is to nominate the most skillful agent, conditional on that agent not be-
ing injured. If both agents remain injury-free, then after observing y1 and y2 the
principal will select j 6= k whenever11
E[ηj | yj] > E[ηk | yk]. (1)
If exactly one of the agents is injured, the principal will select the other agent. If
both agents are injured, none will be selected.
The expected payoff of agent j 6= k ∈ {1, 2} is
(1− r (aj)) (1− r (ak)) Pr {E[ηj | yj] > E[ηk | yk]}Wj
+ (1− r (aj)) r (ak)Wj + Sj(aj)− cj(aj),
where Wj > 0 denotes the (expected) prize j receives if the principal selects him.
The function Sj(aj) measures agent j’s expected gross payoff in the absence of the
11If h1 = h2, then there exists a biased rank-order tournament as in Meyer (1991, 1992) that is
equivalent to the decision rule in (1). In a biased tournament, the contestant with the lower prior
reputation has to outperform the other agents by a given amount to win. For h1 6= h2, the rates
at which the principal updates his beliefs about the agents’ skills as a function of observed outputs
differ, and therefore there is no direct equivalence with a biased tournament.
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nomination contest and cj (aj) his disutility of effort. We assume that Sj(aj)−cj(aj)
is strictly concave and reaches a unique maximum at
anj > 0,
the ”normal” effort level of player j ∈ {1, 2}.
In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agent’s effort choice must be optimal given
the other agent’s effort choice and beliefs, and the principal must correctly anticipate
effort choices. Appendix A contains a detailed analysis of the equilibrium conditions
and comparative statics with respect to the equilibrium effort levels (a∗1, a
∗
2).
The main results are as follows. First, in the benchmark case without any injury
concerns (i.e., r (a) = 0 for all a) we always have a∗j > a
n
j . In this case, a
∗
j depends
on ∆ = |m1 −m2| but not on m1 and m2 individually, and
da∗j
d∆
< 0 if ∆ > 0,
da∗j
d∆
= 0 if ∆ = 0.
As mj varies, the relation between j’s equilibrium effort and equilibrium winning
probability is a symmetric inverted U-shape with a maximum at winning probability
50%. As j’s equilibrium winning probability approaches 0 or 1, respectively, a∗j goes
to anj .
If the injury risk function is increasing instead, the effort impact of the nom-
ination contest is ambiguous. Intuitively, a∗j < a
n
j when the marginal effect of
higher effort on j’s winning probability is small but j has a good winning chance
conditional on remaining injury-free. Ceteris paribus, this is the case if mj is suf-
ficiently high so that j’s winning probability is close enough to 1 but the marginal
effect of effort on the winning probability is close to 0. If on the contrary agent j
has a very low winning chance, the contest will not affect his effort significantly:
lim(mj−mk)→−∞ a
∗
j = a
n
j . For intermediate winning chances and sufficient uncer-
tainty about the agent’s ability, the winning concern dominates the injury concern
(a∗j > a
n
j ) as long as the injury risk function is not too steep. However, a
∗
j as a
function of the equilibrium winning probability always reaches its maximum at a
winning probability strictly below 50% now. Figure 1 depicts the relation between
agent 1’s equilibrium winning probability and his equilibrium effort as his prior
reputation m1 varies in a numerical example. The horizontal line indicates the nor-
mal effort level an1 the player would exert in the absence of the nomination contest.
The equilibrium effort is increasing in the agent’s equilibrium winning probability
for low winning chances, but decreasing for higher winning chances. Moreover, be-
cause of the injury risk the equilibrium effort is maximal at a winning chance below
0.5, and lies below an1 if agent 1 has an equilibrium winning probability sufficiently
close to 1.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium relation between agent 1’s effort level a∗1 and his winning
probability P ∗1 . W1 = 10, m2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 2, hε = 1, S1 (a) = S2 (a) = 10a,
c1 (a) = c2 (a) =
a2
2
, r (a) = 0.05a for a < 20 and r (a) = 1 for a ≥ 20.
In summary, the theory predicts that nomination contest participation leads to
higher than normal effort if an agent has realistic winning chances but is not too
certain of winning either. For agents with very good winning chances, the prediction
is that nomination contest participation leads to less than normal effort as long as
injury concerns are relevant. In the empirical analysis, we will study the evolutions
of observable output and performance measures to test these predictions. The inter-
pretation is that changes in effort (training intensity, motivation and concentration
on the field, lifestyle, ...) lead to changes in performance and can hence be detected
by looking at performance.
3 Institutional Characteristics and Data
3.1 Euro 2008 qualifications and national team nomina-
tions
Our empirical analyses focus on the time period between the end of the World
Cup 2006 on July 9, 2006, and the end of the 2007/08 soccer season on May 17,
2008. The Euro 2008 began on June 7, 2008. As illustrated in the timeline in
Figure 2, the qualification matches for the Euro 2008 started shortly after the World
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Figure 2: Timeline
Cup. All eligible nations, fifty in total for the Euro 2008, usually participate in the
qualification matches. The official announcement of qualified nations took place on
November 21, 2007, but several nations de facto qualified before that date having
won sufficiently many matches. A group of four countries (Czech Republic, Germany,
Greece, and Romania) qualified about one month before the official date, on either
the 13th or 17th of October, while ten other nations qualified on the 17th or 21st
of November. The two remaining participants were Austria and Switzerland, the
host nations, which by the rules of the Cup participate automatically. We exclude
players with citizenship of these two countries from all the empirical analyses.
National coaches can select different players for every non-Cup national team
match if they wish to do so, and as we will document there is indeed considerable
temporal variation in national team compositions for non-Cup matches. For the
Euro 2008, however, all coaches had to nominate a fixed selection of 23 players.
The deadline for the coaches’ announcements of their team selections was May 28,
2008, eleven days after the end of the German soccer season. There were some
differences between qualified countries regarding the date and procedures according
to which national coaches announced their decisions, but most coaches made their
final statements either between the last but one and the last, or after the last game
day of the German soccer season.
A number of other international tournaments took place in the relevant time
period: the Copa America in July 2007, the Africa Cup of Nations in January 2008,
and the 2008 Olympic summer games in August 2008. These Cups could poten-
tially interfere with our analysis by creating similar incentives as the Euro 2008 but
for different groups of players. However, because of their limited media coverage
and endorsement opportunities, participation in these international tournaments is
considerably less attractive for players than a Euro (or World) Cup participation.
Some clubs do not even allow their players to miss club activities in order to par-
ticipate.12 Formally testing for an incentive effect of the Copa America, using the
12For example, Bundesliga clubs Schalke 04 and Werder Bremen clashed with the Brazilian
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same empirical strategy as described below for the Euro 2008, we found no evidence
of any effect. We therefore feel that it is safe to ignore other international Cups for
the purpose of this paper.
3.2 Data and output measurement
We use a panel data set that contains detailed player-game day level information
about the German Soccer League (1. Bundesliga) in the seasons 2006/07 and
2007/08.13 The data provide individual output measures for all participating play-
ers in each match. In addition, we constructed a panel data set of the performance
grades that two major German soccer magazines, Kicker and Sportal, assign to
players after each match. We matched these data sets with data about individual
injuries collected by a firm that runs an online fantasy soccer game.14 Finally, we
collected data on all national team participations of players in our sample between
summer 2005 and the Euro 2008 using publicly available sources.15
Our unit of observation is a player-game day.16 In the analyses herein, we restrict
attention to players for whom we have observations both before and after the official
Euro 2008 qualification date (November 21, 2007), and who were on the field at
least once in the 2006/07 season as well as in the 2007/2008 season. We also exclude
goalkeepers, because they have very different tasks than field players and many of our
output measures are not applicable to them. The remaining number of observations
is 11, 799, including observations where a player spends the entire time on the reserve
bench. There are 18 teams in the Bundesliga and 216 matches per season.
Table 1 lists the nationalities of the players in our sample. The treatment group
consists of all players whose nations participated in the Euro 2008. Players of all
other nationalities are in the control group. About half the players are German,
while the rest originate from all over the world. The Bundesliga was the best
represented national League in the Euro 2008, with active players in fourteen out
of sixteen national teams.
The Bundesliga data contain a variety of detailed individual output measures:
Shots on goal - The ultimate objective in soccer is to shoot goals and prevent
goals by the opponent. Shots on goal includes actual goals, but also failed goal
attempts. The main advantage of using shots on goal instead of goals is that the
national team over the participation of their players in the 2008 Olympic games. Similarly, Guy
Demel of Hamburger SV forwent playing for his home country Ivory Coast in the Africa Cup of
Nations in 2008 to have more time available for his club.
13The data was kindly provided by IMIPRE AG, a company specialized in collecting and selling
soccer data.
14Their website is comunio.de.
15We relied on ESPNsoccernet.com, FIFA.com, Kicker.de, Worldfoot-ball.net, football-
database.eu, as well as the sites of national soccer associations.
16Since no team ever plays twice the same day, each player-game day combination corresponds
to a unique player-match combination.
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Table 1: Number of players by nationality
Group Nationality Players
Euro 2008
Czech Republic 8
Croatia 7
France 2
Germany 121
Greece 3
Netherlands 5
Poland 7
Portugal 3
Romania 2
Russia 1
Sweden 2
Turkey 3
All Euro 2008 164
non-Euro 2008
Albania 2
Algeria 1
Argentinia 5
Australia 2
Belgium 3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3
Brazil 17
Cameroon 2
Canada 1
China 1
Congo DR 1
Denmark 7
Egypt 1
Finland 1
Georgia 1
Ghana 3
Guinea 1
Hungary 2
Iran 2
Ivory Coast 3
Japan 1
Macedonia 2
Mexico 2
Namibia 1
Nigeria 1
Paraguay 2
Peru 1
Serbia 3
Slovakia 3
South Africa 1
Tunesia 2
Uruguay 2
USA 1
All non-Euro 2008 81
All players 246
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeepers, players of Austrian or Swiss na-
tionality, or players for whom we have observations in one season only or
only either after or before the official Euro 2008 qualification date.
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former occur much more frequently. It is not unusual for matches to end without
any goals.
Passes received - The data contains the number of passes a player receives from
his teammates in every match. This is a good indicator of how active and fit a player
is, and of his teammates’ trust in his ability to make a valuable contribution.
Ball contacts - Ball contacts is a more aggregate measure than passes received
of how involved a player is, and also reflects a player’s success in obtaining the ball.
Duels won - A duel is a situation where two players fight for the ball in direct
confrontation. A duel counts as won if the player himself or one of his teammates
obtains the ball in the end. Duels won measures physical fitness and dedication.
Duels carry a high risk of injury, and a player who is keen on avoiding an injury
may choose to fight less vigorously in a duel or stay out of duels altogether.
Minutes played - The data also include detailed information on player substi-
tutions. Coaches are allowed to make at most three substitutions per match, and
typically make use of this possibility at least twice. Approximately 80% of substi-
tutions take place in the last 30 minutes of a match (total duration is 90 minutes
plus a few minutes extra time). It makes sense to view a player’s number of min-
utes played as a relevant output measure. First, players’ performances on the field
influence substitution decisions. Second, the club coach’s decision to let a player be
a starter or substitute him in depends on the player’s effort and performance during
training.17
The discussion of substitutions implies that observed changes in individual out-
puts per match could be due to changes in minutes played (see Table 3 for cor-
relations between per match outputs and minutes played). We take two steps to
disentangle other output dimensions from minutes played. First, we use outputs per
minute played instead of per match to measure performance. Second, for output per
minute regressions we keep only observations associated with at least 71 minutes,
the median substitution time for starters conditional on being substituted out. The
second restriction is useful to avoid comparing observations associated with only a
few minutes on the field (usually towards the end of a match) and much longer field
appearances. The average number of ball contacts per minute, for example, is about
0.606 for players who play 71 minutes or less, but 0.635 for players who play more
than 71 minutes. The difference between the averages for players who play more
than 71 and those who play more than 90 minutes is much smaller: 0.635 versus
0.628. Adding the condition that minutes played exceed the median substitution
time for starters hence substantially alleviates the problem of comparing observa-
tions based on field appearances of different durations, while permitting us to keep
17Even famous players sometimes have to work hard to convince the coach to let them play. A
point in case is Lukas Podolski, a star of the German national team during World Cup 2006, who
had just five Bundesliga starts between August 2007 and September 2008 at the Bayern Mu¨nchen
team.
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observations of players who were substituted out towards the end of a match.
In addition to the objectively measurable outputs listed so far, we use the grades
that the soccer magazines Kicker and Sportal assign to players after each match as
performance measures. Grades have the advantage of being an overall assessment
of a player’s multi-dimensional performance. The disadvantage is that grades are
subjective judgements by journalists, and hence likely to be influenced by expec-
tations prior to the match and subjective biases. Grades are recorded as numbers
between 1 (excellent) and 6 (insufficient) in the data, but we used the linear trans-
formation ’6−grade’ to generate a measure that is increasing and thereby facilitate
the interpretation of results.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for players in the control and treatment
group, respectively, and Table 3 reports correlations between the different output
measures. All statistics refer to Bundesliga club matches.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for players from nations participating (164 play-
ers) and not participating (81 players) in the Euro 2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Euro 2008 nationalities (N = 6588)
Age 27.08 3.91 19.43 38.58
Defense (dummy) .339 .473 0 1
Midfield (dummy) .485 .500 0 1
Forward (dummy) .176 .381 0 1
Minutes played 73.87 27.25 1 96
Goals per minute .002 .006 0 .125
Shots on goal per minute .017 .024 0 .33
Passes received per minute .309 .154 0 1.33
Ball contacts per minute .613 .207 0 2
Duels won per minute .135 .072 0 1
Kicker grade (N = 5664) 2.349 .925 0 5
Sportal grade (N = 5922) 2.421 .813 0 5
Non-Euro 2008 nationalities (N = 3450)
Age 28.76 3.32 19.90 36.69
Defense (dummy) .388 .487 0 1
Midfield (dummy) .405 .491 0 1
Forward (dummy) .207 .405 0 1
Minutes played 74.04 26.86 1 96
Goals per minute .002 .008 0 .25
Shots on goal per minute .018 .026 0 .5
Passes received per minute .313 .150 0 1.06
Ball contacts per minute .626 .208 0 1.6
Duels won per minute .140 .073 0 2
Kicker grade (N = 2971) 2.328 .958 0 5
Sportal grade (N = 3142) 2.445 .830 0 5
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeepers, players of Austrian or Swiss nationality, or play-
ers for whom we have observations in only one season or only either after or before the
official Euro 2008 qualification date. The summary statistics are calculated on the basis
of observations associated with a positive number of minutes on the field.
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Our data also contain information about fouls. Conceptually, fouls suffered could
be interpreted as a positive performance measure, the idea being that stronger play-
ers are more difficult to stop for the opponent team. Fouls committed can be viewed
as a measure of destructive effort. This is the approach taken by Garicano and
Palacios-Huerta (2006), who provide empirical evidence for Lazear’s (1989) predic-
tion that relative performance evaluations can lead to undesirable sabotage. Once
we control for constant differences between players by means of player fixed effects,
however, our regressions show no significant effects of nomination contest participa-
tion on either fouls suffered or fouls committed.
4 Empirical Strategy
To test for the effects of nomination contest participation on players with different
chances of being selected for the Euro 2008, we first construct the following time-
varying variable in [0, 1] that measures player i’s more recent national team history:
pastselectit =
number of i’s field appearances in the
past 15 matches of his nation’s national team
15
, (2)
where national team matches include friendly matches, qualification matches for the
Euro 2008 or other international tournaments, and tournament matches.18 Play-
ers’ recent national team participations, as captured by pastselect, are based on
national team coaches’ perceptions of players’ skills, which will also determine fu-
ture nominations. Players with higher pastselect values should hence have greater
future nomination probabilities than rival candidates with lower pastselect values.
Table 12 in Appendix B shows that the values of pastselect at the time of final
nomination decisions (at the end of the 07/08 season) are indeed closely related to
the actual nominations for the German Euro 2008 team. Uncertainty seems to have
been greatest for players with final values of pastselect between .1 and .5: three
out of ten players in this group were nominated. At high values, pastselect seems
to understate a player’s actual nomination chance: all players whose pastselect at
the end of the 07/08 season exceeded .6 were nominated. Overall, the predicted
qualitative relation between pastselect and nomination contest effort is the same
18The results remain similar if we treat each other tournament as consisting of a single match
when constructing pastselect. The results are also robust to small changes in the number of past
games used to construct pastselect, or to using the proportion of a player’s appearances in either
all national team matches in the past 360 days or all national team matches since summer 2005 or
summer 2006 instead of the definition in (2). Only actual field appearances are used to compute
pastselect because for some national team matches we were unable to obtain information on the
full list of reserve players.
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Figure 3: Histogram of pastselectit for nationals of Euro 2008 nations, conditional
on pastselectit > 0. The number of players is 59, and the number of observations is
2607.
as that between nomination chance and effort, although pastselect should not be
understood as a precise estimate of individual nomination probability.
In our sample, pastselectit = 0 at all dates t for 105 out of the 164 players in the
treatment group, and for 14 of the 81 players in the control group. Figure 3 depicts
the distribution of pastselect observations for players of Euro 2008 nationalities,
conditional on pastselectit > 0. Figure 4 shows the analogue to Figure 3 for the
control group. The histograms confirm that the data contain variation in nomination
chances. Many Bundesliga players are sometimes selected for their national team,
but there are relatively few observations with pastselect very close to 1, which is
probably due to the fact that most soccer superstars work for better-paying English,
Spanish or Italian clubs.
Our theory predicts that nomination contest participation affects the effort de-
cision of players who have a positive nomination chance. Players in the treatment
group who currently believe they will be nominated with an intermediate probability
should have the strongest incentives to exert additional effort in order to impress the
national coach. A player whose current nomination chance is close to one, on the
other hand, expecting that a small performance change will not affect the national
coach’s decision, has weaker incentives to exert additional effort. In addition, play-
ers with positive nomination chances should have stronger than normal incentives
to avoid exhaustion and injuries prior to the Euro Cup, which could even lead to a
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Figure 4: Histogram of pastselectit for players who are not from Euro 2008 nations,
conditional on pastselectit > 0. The number of players is 67, and the number of
observations is 2867.
negative net effect of contest participation for players with high nomination chances.
To test these predictions, we run the following difference-in-difference-in-differences
regressions:
Yint = δ0qualifiednt
+ δ1qualifiedntpastselectit + δ2qualifiedntpastselectit (1− pastselectit)
+ η1pastselectit + η2pastselectit (1− pastselectit)
+ ρ1euronpastselectit + ρ2euronpastselectit (1− pastselectit)
+ pi1posttpastselectit + pi2posttpastselectit (1− pastselectit)
+ γi + αt +X
′
itβ + εint.
(3)
where Yint is the output of player i of nationality n on game day t. We run separate
regressions for different output measures. The treatment dummy qualifiednt equals
1 if and only if nation n is qualified for the Euro 2008 at time t. The theory predicts
that δ0, the treatment effect for players with no recent national team participations,
is zero. The coefficient δ2 is predicted to be positive, since players with uncertain
chances, i.e., high values of pastselect(1-pastselect), have strong effort incentives.
δ1 is predicted to be negative if injury concerns and energy preservation strategies
are relevant. We also run regressions with tertile or quartile dummies of pastselect
instead of pastselect and pastselect(1-pastselect) as robustness checks for the func-
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tional form assumption. In all cases, the various pastselect variables also enter the
regression equations interacted with a euron dummy that indicates whether nation
n was a Euro 2008 participant, and postt, which indicates the time period after the
official Euro 2008 qualification date (November 21, 2007).19
The player fixed effects γi pick up (time-invariant) skill differences between play-
ers, and the game day fixed effects αt control for changes in playing conditions over
time that affect all clubs. Xit also includes dummies that indicate the club the
player currently works for,20 and dummies that indicate the opponent team i’s club
faces on day t. Since it is relatively common for players to occupy different field po-
sitions (forward, midfield or defense) in different matches, the covariates moreover
include field position dummies. Finally, Xit includes a homegameit dummy indi-
cating whether i’s current club plays in its home stadium on day t, and an unfitit
dummy indicating whether the player is injured or recovering from an injury.21
In our main alternative specification, we use club-game day dummies instead of
the game day, club, opponent, and homegame dummies. There are two club-game
day dummies per match, one per participating club. These dummies capture unob-
served differences in the marginal returns from a victory across matches and clubs
(depending, for example, on the current degree of competition for the championship
and the club’s current ranking), and other differences in playing conditions (weather
etc.) between matches and clubs. Inclusion of these finer club-game day dummies
substantially improves fit.
The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the Euro Cup treatment,
players from qualified and from non-qualified nations would have evolved similarly
over time (given controls). Since players in the treatment and the control group
work in the same environment and are subject to similar incentive systems in the
absence of international Cups, we find little reason to doubt this. A player’s el-
igibility for the Euro Cup treatment, i.e., his nation’s participation in the Euro
Cup qualifications, is determined exogenously by geography and the player’s na-
tionality.22 Within the group of Europeans, the assignment of the treatment, i.e.,
a nation’s qualification, should depend on the skills of the players who participated
in the Euro Cup qualification matches, so for a small number of European players
selection into the treatment group is not completely random at this stage. Since
we control for constant output differences by means of player fixed effects, however,
bias caused by potential correlation between these players’ outputs and treatment
19qualifiednt = postt×euron for nations that qualified on the official qualification date (November
21, 2007). For nations that already de facto qualified at an earlier date, qualifiednt is equal to 1
from the de facto qualification date onwards.
20Several players in our sample switched between clubs in the sample period.
21Note that if a player is seriously injured, he will not show up in our output dataset, which only
contains observations for players who were either on the reserve bench or on the field.
22In rare cases players change nationality. Formerly Brazilian player Deco’s adopted Portuguese
citizenship, for example, mainly to participate in the Euro 2004 and World Cup 2006. Authorities
and the FIFA have a critical attitude to such steps, however, which are therefore very rare.
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status is largely if not completely eliminated in our results.
An underlying assumption is that the de facto qualification dates are relevant for
determining the beginning of the treatment for Euro 2008 - Europeans. Our analysis
builds on the insight that on a nation’s de facto qualification date its qualification
probability exhibits a discrete and permanent upward jump (to one).23 One may
argue however that players from countries that are likely to qualify may have already
altered their effort earlier on. Such effects tend to bias against finding performance
responses to qualification, thereby making our estimates conservative.
Because the data on minutes played take on nonnegative integer values (between
0 and 96), a count model is appropriate in regressions with minutes played as the
dependent variable. We will use the negative binomial model, as the Poisson model is
rejected at high degrees of confidence.24 For the other dependent variables, outputs
(shots on goal,...) per minute played and grades, we use OLS estimation. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the individual player level to take into account
serial correlation.25 The resulting estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is
consistent as the number of players in our data is large (see Bertrand et al., 2004).
5 Results
Tables 4 to 11 report results of regressions with different performance measures as
the dependent variable. For minutes played, we present both OLS and negative
binomial regression results (Tables 4 and 5). We will first discuss overall patterns
in the results, and then turn to differences between various output measures.
Columns (1) and (2) of each table report results for the basic regression specifica-
tion in equation (3). The regressors of main interest are the interactions
qualified×pastselect(1-pastselect) and qualified×pastselect. For all output mea-
sures, the coefficient of the former is positive and that of the latter negative, as
predicted by our theory. For minutes played, passes received, ball contacts, and
Sportal grades, both coefficients are statistically significant, mostly at the 1% or 5%
23Similarly, for non-qualified European nations there is a downward jump to zero at some point
in time, in some cases long before the official qualification date. The group of players from such
nations in our sample is small (n = 23).
24Allison and Waterman (2002) and Guimara˜es (2008) show that for the negative binomial model
the estimator proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) is a conditional fixed effects estimator under
very specific assumptions only. As suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002), player fixed effects
can be included by means of player dummies, however, which is the approach we follow.
25If class is player identity, the intraclass correlations for the various output measures we employ
lie between 0.2 and 0.4. Note also that while the regression equation in the text allow error terms
to depend on nationality n, within-group correlations at the nationality level are low: for all our
output measures the intraclass correlation if class is nationality lies below 0.1, in many cases even
below 0.05.
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level. The sizes of the coefficients are such that the implied net impact of nomination
contest participation is positive for pastselect values up to somewhere between .6
and .7, depending on the output measure, and negative thereafter. The latter is in
line with our earlier observation, based on Table 12 in Appendix B, that pastselect
above .6 suggests certain nomination, so that injury concerns dominate. Positive
effects are maximal for pastselect between .3 and .4, i.e., for players with appear-
ances in 30 − 40% of their country’s recent national team matches. For instance,
the estimated effect of nomination contest participation on the passes received per
minute of a player with pastselect equal to .3 is about +8% (with respect to pre-
treatment observations with pastselect-values between .2 and .4 of treatment group
players). The corresponding effects on other performance measures are of similar
magnitudes: +7% for ball contacts per minute, +9% (or 5.7 field minutes) for min-
utes played, and +6% for Sportal grades. For shots on goal (Table 8), where only
the positive interaction qualified×pastselect(1-pastselect) is significant (p < 0.1),
the estimated positive impact of nomination contest participation for a player with
pastselect = 0.3 is as high as 25%.26 The coefficient of qualified, which measures the
impact of nomination contest participation for players without any recent national
team participations, is insignificant in all these regressions. This is consistent with
the theoretical prediction that players without nomination chances do not alter their
efforts.
Columns (3) to (6) of the regression tables report results of regression with dum-
mies for different percentiles of positive pastselect values. These regressions confirm
that negative effects for players with high nomination chances are not an artifact of
the functional form of pastselect in the basic regression equation discussed so far. In
the regressions with club-game day dummies, interactions of the treatment with the
top tertile or quartile of pastselect (pastselect above .6429 and .7333, respectively)
have a significant negative impact on many output measures: minutes played, ball
contacts, passes received, Kicker grades, and duels won. These negative effects are
economically significant. The regressions for ball contacts per minute with club-
game day dummies (columns (3) and (5) in Table 7) imply output reductions of
about 10% for players in the top tertile and top quartile. The corresponding effects
on passes received per minute are −14% and −13%.
For low pastselect percentiles, the coefficients of the interactions with the treat-
ment are generally positive,27 as predicted by the theory, but not always significant.
26All effects were calculated on the basis of the regressions with club-game day dummies in
columns (1). Since the regressions results with different dummies reported in columns (2) are very
similar, the estimated effects would be very close if we used those estimated instead.
27An exception occurs in Table 11 where in column (5) the interaction of qualified with the lowest
pastselect quartile is negative and significant. The coefficient of qualified is positive and significant
in this regression as well, however, and jointly the two coefficients are statistically insignificant.
For observations in the highest pastselect quartile, on the other hand, the joint effect is is negative
and significant at the 5% level.
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Where significant, the effects are substantial. In the case of passes received (Ta-
ble 6), for instance, we find positive effects of about 11% and 9% for the lowest
pastselect tertile and the second pastselect quartile.
In the regressions with club, opponent and game day dummies (columns (4) and
(6) of each table), the coefficient of qualified is negative and statistically significant
for some output measures, which is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction that
nomination contest participation affects only the effort of players with positive nom-
ination chances. In all regressions, however, the effect vanishes once finer club-game
day dummies are used.
There are interesting differences between the findings for the various output
measures. The theory implies that players with high nomination chances should
reduce activities that carry a high injury risk. This is consistent with our finding
that nomination contest participation has negative effects on the number of duels
won. In the basic regression equation (columns (1) and (2) in Table 9) only the
negative interaction term with pastselect is significant and in the regressions with
dummies the only significant effects are negative ones. These negative impacts are
economically significant: we find a 13% reduction in the number of duels won for
players in the top pastselect tertile for example. Players with high nomination
chances hence seem to be less persistent in duels, which carry a much higher injury
risk than actions in less direct confrontation with players of the opponent team. The
results are similar in unreported regressions with total duels instead of duels won as
the dependent variable, which suggests that players with high nomination chances
also avoid fighting duels in the first place.
The control variables have the expected signs. The coefficient of homegame is
positive and highly significant in most regressions. Interestingly, homegame is also
significant in the regressions with grades as the dependent variable. Soccer jour-
nalists hence do not seem to discount performances for the well-known homegame
advantage when grading players. A forward field position is associated with more
frequent goal attempts but fewer ball contacts, while midfield positions are associ-
ated with significantly more duels than forward or defense positions. The results for
minutes played show that there are also more substitutions of players in forward and
midfield positions than of players in defense positions. The coefficient of injured has
a negative sign in all regressions, but is statistically significant for minutes played
only.
To summarize our findings on the differential effects of the Euro Cup treatment:
1. Players from qualified countries with intermediate national team nomination
chances perform better in club matches (relative to players of other national-
ities with similar national team experience) after their nations’ qualifications
for the Euro 2008 than before.
2. Players from qualified countries with very high national team nomination
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Table 4: Regression results for minutes played (Negbin FE Model)
VARIABLES
Minutes played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified .048 .067 .059 .078 .062 .079
(.102) (.085) (.105) (.088) (.106) (.088)
qualified ×
pastselect -.632*** -.538***
(.241) (.196)
pastselect(1-pastselect) 1.659** 1.426**
(.814) (.675)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile .076 .059
(.165) (.146)
pastselect2ndTertile .152 .133
(.163) (.111)
pastselect3rdTertile -.273** -.264**
(.134) (.106)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .049 -.00002
(.188) (.160)
pastselect2ndQuartile .269 .254*
(.170) (.134)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.140 -.039
(.150) (.132)
pastselect4thQuartile -.336** -.269**
(.170) (.105)
forward -.576*** -.508*** -.579*** -.510*** -.580*** -.507***
(.144) (.128) (.143) (.128) (.143) (.128)
midfield -.372*** -.326*** -.372*** -.325*** -.371*** -.321***
(.100) (.089) (.101) (.089) (.101) (.090)
injured -.181*** -.155*** -.178*** -.154*** -.177*** -.153***
(.044) (.035) (.044) (.035) (.044) (.035)
pastselect .144 .245
(.198) (.151)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -.035 .252
(.635) (.564)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799
Notes: The table reports negative binomial regression estimates. Values between parentheses are robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations from players who are neither goalkeepers nor Aus-
trian or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07
and the 07/08 season, and before and after 21 Nov 2007, and with at least one strictly positive observation of
minutes played in the two seasons.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
Chapter 3: Effort in Nomination Contests: Evidence from Professional Soccer 79
Table 5: Regression results for minutes played (Linear FE Model)
VARIABLES
Minutes played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified 2.663 4.280 3.532 5.238 3.626 5.337*
( 3.587) ( 3.172) ( 3.624) ( 3.213) ( 3.628) ( 3.219)
qualified ×
pastselect -33.490*** -29.670***
(11.240) (10.660)
pastselect(1-pastselect) 75.180** 62.680*
(35.950) (34.200)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile 1.688 -.324
( 6.309) ( 6.116)
pastselect2ndTertile 4.489 4.002
( 6.503) ( 4.980)
pastselect3rdTertile -16.850*** -17.200***
( 5.426) ( 5.223)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .279 -2.777
( 7.103) ( 6.631)
pastselect2ndQuartile 9.538 9.267
( 7.295) ( 6.734)
pastselect3rdQuartile -3.888 -4.310
( 6.940) ( 6.552)
pastselect4thQuartile -19.480** -18.250***
( 5.695) ( 4.926)
forward -21.960*** -20.810*** -22.120*** -20.910*** -22.120*** -20.800***
( 4.742) ( 4.622) ( 4.733) ( 4.623) ( 4.732) ( 4.620)
midfield -17.480*** -16.000*** -17.550*** -16.000*** -17.430*** -15.850***
( 3.482) ( 3.406) ( 3.491) ( 3.423) ( 3.513) ( 3.434)
injured -8.572*** -7.636*** -8.610*** -7.693*** -8.530*** -7.616***
( 1.686) ( 1.488) ( 1.687) ( 1.470) ( 1.695) ( 1.486)
pastselect 6.153 11.670
( 9.091) ( 7.603)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -9.026 -1.078
(26.740) (25.910)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799
Variance captured
.58 .56 .58 .56 .58 .56
by player FE
R2 .13 .07 .13 .07 .13 .07
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects regression estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations from players who are neither goalkeepers
nor Austrian or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the
06/07 and the 07/08 season, and before and after 21 Nov 2007, and with at least one strictly positive obser-
vation of minutes played in the two seasons.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Regression results for passes received
VARIABLES
Passes received per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified -.011 -.020 -.012 -.027** -.011 -.026**
(.009) (.012) (.009) (.011) (.009) (.011)
qualified ×
pastselect -.131*** -.099**
(.034) (.040)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .322*** .356***
(.099) (.115)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile .036** .066***
(.017) (.017)
pastselect2ndTertile -.006 .015
(.018) (.016)
pastselect3rdTertile -.053*** -.014
(.022) (.020)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .026 .056***
(.017) (.018)
pastselect2ndQuartile .030* .054***
(.017) (.018)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.034* .001
(.018) (.020)
pastselect4thQuartile -.049** -.010
(.023) (.027)
home game .030*** .030*** .030***
(.003) (.003) (.003)
forward -.005 -.009 -.005 -.010 -.006 -.008
(.012) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.012) (.013)
midfield .009 .011 .009 .010 .009 .010
(.009) (.010) (.009) (.010) (.009) (.010)
injured -.003 -.001 -.003 -.001 -.003 -.001
(.006) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007)
pastselect -.009 .006
(.018) (.025)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .017 .065
(.057) (.072)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .46 .38 .50 .38 .48 .38
R2 .55 .19 .55 .19 .55 .19
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71
minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included.
Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08
season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive observation of
the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Regression results for ball contacts
VARIABLES
Ball contacts per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified -.016 -.024 -.018 -.033** -.018 -.032**
(.012) (.016) (.012) (.015) (.012) (.015)
qualified ×
pastselect -.183*** -.117**
(.045) (.047)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .455*** .410***
(.126) (.136)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile .051** .079***
(.020) (.021)
pastselect2ndTertile -.009 .010
(.023) (.023)
pastselect3rdTertile -.075** -.016
(.031) (.030)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .038* .070***
(.022) (.021)
pastselect2ndQuartile .035 .052**
(.022) (.024)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.048 -.003
(.028) (.028)
pastselect4thQuartile -.070** -.010
(.032) (.032)
home game .037*** .037*** .037***
(.004) (.004) (.004)
forward -.112*** -.118*** -.112*** -.120*** -.102*** -.118***
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.034) (.020)
midfield -.083*** -.081*** -.083*** -.082*** -.057** -.082***
(.017) (.017) (.018) (.017) (.027) (.018)
injured -.008 -.001 -.007 -.001 -.147 -.001
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.013) (.008)
pastselect -.015 .009
(.026) (.031)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .041 .092
(.078) (.085)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .54 .47 .56 .47 .54 .47
R2 .46 .17 .46 .17 .46 .17
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71
minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included.
Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08
season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive observation of the
dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Regression results for shots on goal
VARIABLES
Shots on goal per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
qualified ×
pastselect -.005 -.005
(.004) (.003)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .023* .022*
(.013) (.012)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile .001 .001
(.002) (.002)
pastselect2ndTertile .001 .001
(.003) (.002)
pastselect3rdTertile .0002 .001
(.003) (.002)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .001 .0001
(.003) (.002)
pastselect2ndQuartile .004 .004
(.003) (.003)
pastselect3rdQuartile .002 .002
(.003) (.003)
pastselect4thQuartile -.005 -.004
(.003) (.003)
home game .036*** .004*** .004***
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
forward .008*** .008*** .008*** .008*** .008*** .008***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
midfield .007*** .007*** .007*** .007*** .007** .007***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
injured -.002* -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
pastselect .005* .005**
(.003) (.002)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .0004 .001
(.008) (.008)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .41 .41 .42 .40 .41 .41
R2 .24 .07 .24 .07 .24 .07
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71
minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included.
Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08
season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive observation of the
dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 9: Regression results for duels won
VARIABLES
Duels won per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified .0001 .002 .0001 .001 .0002 .002
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
qualified ×
pastselect -.024** -.022**
(.010) (.009)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .032 .023
(.039) (.036)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile .003 .005
(.008) (.007)
pastselect2ndTertile -.009 -.010
(.007) (.006)
pastselect3rdTertile -.017** -.014***
(.007) (.006)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .002 .004
(.008) (.007)
pastselect2ndQuartile -.008 -.008
(.008) (.007)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.008 -.010
(.008) (.007)
pastselect4thQuartile -.014* -.012*
(.008) (.007)
home game .005*** .005*** .005***
(.001) (.001) (.001)
forward .008 .007 .008 .007 .009 .008
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
midfield .009** .009** .008** .009** .009** .009**
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
injured -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
pastselect -.003 -.006
(.009) (.007)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -.011 -.001
(.023) (.023)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .41 .38 .41 .38 .46 .38
R2 .24 .07 .25 .07 .25 .07
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects estimates. Values between parentheses are ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more
than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are
included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and
the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive ob-
servation of the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 10: Regression results for Sportal grades
VARIABLES
Sportal grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified -.032 -.071 -.035 -.093 -.038 -.092
(.056) (.058) (.056) (.062) (.056) (.062)
qualified ×
pastselect -.431** -.440**
(.189) (.196)
pastselect(1-pastselect) 1.295* 1.599**
(.658) (.646)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile .070 .189*
(.106) (.112)
pastselect2ndTertile .072 .074
(.110) (.118)
pastselect3rdTertile -.140 -.034
(.123) (.136)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile .044 .135
(.115) (.134)
pastselect2ndQuartile .020 .224*
(.140) (.131)
pastselect3rdQuartile .062 -.004
(.120) (.138)
pastselect4thQuartile -.162 -.102
(.147) (.163)
home game .222*** .222*** .222***
(.017) (.017) (.017)
forward .115 .095 .120 .092 .123 .099
(.011) (.116) (.107) (.114) (.107) (.116)
midfield .081 .102 .087 .102 .084 .101
(.060) (.066) (.059) (.065) (.059) (.065)
injured -.030 -.054 -.031 -.057 -.028 -.053
(.042) (.044) (.042) (.044) (.043) (.044)
pastselect -.055 -.068
(.119) (.133)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .021 -.280
(.448) (.469)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721
Variance captured by player FE .32 .26 .32 .27 .33 .27
R2 .45 .05 .45 .06 .45 .06
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects estimates. Values between parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with
more than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian
or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in
both the 06/07 and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least
one strictly positive observation of the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 11: Regression results for Kicker grades
VARIABLES
Kicker grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualified -.107 -.407 .129 .032 .132* .030
(.075) (.075) (.078) (.079) (.076) (.079)
qualified ×
pastselect -.447** -.437*
(.192) (.224)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .417 1.050
(.700) (.767)
qualified ×
pastselect1stTertile -.172 .015
(.118) (.130)
pastselect2ndTertile -.105 .003
(.138) (.143)
pastselect3rdTertile -.335** -.159
(.137) (.155)
qualified ×
pastselect1stQuartile -.230* -.054
(.139) (.158)
pastselect2ndQuartile -.097 .179
(.141) (.157)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.162 -.093
(.140) (.156)
pastselect4thQuartile -.355** -.223
(.150) (.176)
home game .233*** .233*** .233***
(.020) (.020) (.020)
forward .032 .045 .038 .046 .043 .048
(.095) (.115) (.094) (.113) (.093) (.114)
midfield -.080 -.014 -.079 -.015 -.081 -.017
(.054) (.068) (.053) (.066) (.053) (.067)
injured .017 -.018 .015 -.021 .013 -.021
(.051) (.055) (.050) (.055) (.050) (.055)
pastselect .084 .040
(.141) (.152)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -.266 -.251
(.450) (.568)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6722 6722 6722 6722 6722 6722
Variance captured by player FE .31 .28 .31 .27 .30 .28
R2 .48 .05 .48 .06 .48 .06
Notes: The table reports linear fixed effects estimates. Values between parentheses are ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more
than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss
are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07
and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive
observation of the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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chances perform worse in club matches (relative to players of other national-
ities with similar national team experience) after their nations’ qualifications
for the Euro 2008 than before.
6 Conclusion
Contest-style rivalry, whether based on pre-specified performance criteria or reputa-
tions as the nominations for national soccer teams, arises in many contexts. Some
firms explicitly offer promotion prospects or use relative performance evaluation
schemes in order to provide incentives to employees. In many other situations, the
principal’s goal is to select the most skillful agent, but this creates similar incentives.
In either case, economic theory predicts that agents’ effort responses should depend
on their anticipated winning probabilities. In particular, agents with intermediate
winning probabilities should exert higher than normal effort. This paper provides
empirical evidence for this prediction. We show that players from nations qualified
for the Euro 2008 who had been called upon by the national coach in some but not
too many past national team matches improved their club performance, relative to
players of other nationalities with a similar standing in their national teams, after
their countries’ qualifications. For players without any past national team nomina-
tions, on the other hand, there is no evidence of any improvement relative to players
of other nationalities.
Moreover, we find that players who were already quite certain of their Euro Cup
participations performed worse along several dimensions than they would have in
the absence of the upcoming Cup. Our explanation is that these players wanted to
avoid injuries and more generally preserve their strength and fitness for the Cup.
Hence, while clubs often benefit from the national team nomination contests, they
may actually suffer losses in the case of top players. Similar effects can occur in
other situations where agents compete for a position that requires future effort
instead of a monetary prize. Consider promotion contests in firms for example. An
employee who expects an almost certain promotion into a different unit may be
inclined to exert less effort in his current position in order to preserve energy for his
new position. Such behavior inflicts a loss on the employee’s current unit. Ensuring
that rivalry between candidates persists is key to avoiding such losses and promoting
effort. Effort will be higher if several candidates perceive that they have realistic
but less than perfect chances of obtaining the promotion.
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Appendix A: Analysis of the Theoretical Model
Denote by (a∗1, a∗2) the equilibrium effort levels. Thanks to our normality and indepen-
dence assumptions, the learning process about each agent’s skill is well-known. Given the
principal anticipates effort level a∗j , the posterior distribution of ηj after observing yj will
be normal with mean
hjmj + hε(yj − a∗j )
hj + hε
(A.1)
and precision hj + hε.
Let us now consider j’s effort decision at the beginning of the period. From (A.1) it
follows that, given ak = a
∗
k, if j chooses aj then he will have a higher posterior reputation
than agent k with probability
Pr
{
hjmj + hε(ηj + aj + εj − a∗j )
hj + hε
>
hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
}
(A.2)
= Pr
{
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j ) >
hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
− hjmj + hε(ηj + εj)
hj + hε
}
. (A.3)
Define the random variable
ζj ≡ hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
− hjmj + hε(ηj + εj)
hj + hε
.
Our independence and normality assumptions imply that the prior distribution of ζj is
normal with mean
zj ≡ mk −mj (A.4)
and variance28
σ2 ≡
(
hε
hk + hε
)2( 1
hk
+
1
hε
)
+
(
hε
hj + hε
)2( 1
hj
+
1
hε
)
(A.5)
We denote this distribution by ϕj (·) with c.d.f. φj (·). Moreover, let us denote by
σ (hj , hk, hε), equal to the square root of σ
2 defined in (A.5), the standard deviation
of the distributions ϕ1 (·) and ϕ2 (·).
28Since the prior distributions of ζ1 and ζ2 have the same variance, we can simply denote this
variance by σ2, not using any subscript.
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Using the newly defined variable ζj , the probability in (A.3) that j’s posterior reputa-
tion exceeds that of k can be rewritten as
Pr
{
ζj <
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j )
}
= φj
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j )
)
. (A.6)
Given ak = a
∗
k, the marginal impact of aj on the probability that j has a higher posterior
reputation than k is equal to the first derivative of (A.6) with respect to aj :
ϕj
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j )
)
hε
hj + hε
.
The first-order conditions for an equilibrium are then that for all j 6= k ∈ {1, 2}:
[
1− r (a∗j)]ϕj (0) hεhj + hεWj + S′j(a∗j )− c′j(a∗j ) = r′ (a∗j) [[1− r (a∗k)]φj (0) + r (a∗k)]Wj .
(A.7)
Consider the special case without injury risk, that is, r(a) = 0 for all a, first. Making
use of the normality of ϕj (·), the first-order condition defining a∗j can be rewritten as
1√
2piσ (hj , hk, hε)
exp
(
− (mk −mj)
2
2σ2 (hj , hk, hε)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj + S
′
j
(
a∗j
)− c′j (a∗j) = 0, (A.8)
which is equivalent to
1√
2piσ (hj , hk, hε)
exp
(
− |mk −mj |
2
2σ2 (hj , hk, hε)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj + S
′
j
(
a∗j
)− c′j (a∗j) = 0. (A.9)
The latter condition depends on ∆ ≡ |m1 −m2| but not on m1 and m2 individually. As
is apparent from the first-order conditions, lim∆→−∞ a∗j = lim∆→∞ a
∗
j = a
n
j when there
are no injury risks. Assuming that the second-order condition for a maximum holds,29 the
implicit function theorem implies that
sign
(
da∗j
d∆
)
= sign
(
ϕj (0)
( −2∆
2σ2 (hj , hk, hε)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj
)
. (A.10)
It follows directly from (A.10) that
da∗j
d∆ < 0 for ∆ > 0, and that
da∗j
d∆ = 0 for ∆ = 0, in
which case j′s equilibrium winning probability, φj (0), is equal to 12 .
30
29It is easy to check that the second-order condition always holds for small enough ∆ in the
model without injury concerns.
30With more than two contestants, the analysis is considerably more complex. In particular, an
agent’s effort incentive is no longer maximal if his prior reputation is the same as that of his rivals
(assuming the rivals all have the same prior reputations). Rather, the agent’s effort incentive will
be maximal if he has an advantage over his rivals and an equilibrium winning probability between
1
n , where n is the number of contestants, and
1
2 .
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If r′ > 0 and the second-order condition holds, then
sign
(
da∗j
d(mj −mk)
)
(A.11)
= sign
[1− r (a∗j)] dϕj (0)d(mj −mk) hεhj + hε − r′ (a∗j) [1− r (a∗k)] dφj (0)d(mj −mk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 . (A.12)
Since the mean of ϕj is mk −mj , dφj(0)d(mk−mj) < 0 which implies
dφj(0)
d(mj−mk) > 0. Overall, the
second term in (A.12) is therefore always negative. As implied by the discussion of the
situation without injury concerns,
dϕj(0)
d(mj−mk) = 0 for mj = mk,
dϕj(0)
d(mj−mk) < 0 if mj > mk,
and
dϕj(0)
d(mj−mk) > 0 if mj < mk. Since the second term in (A.12) is negative, we can
conclude that
da∗j
d(mj−mk) < 0 whenever mj ≥ mk. If j has a (weak) advantage over k,
then further improvements in j’s relative position reduce j’s effort. In the limit where
j is certain to win conditional on remaining injury-free, lim(mj−mk)→∞ φj (0) = 1 and
lim(mj−mk)→∞ ϕj (0) = 0, hence the first-order condition in (A.7) directly implies that
lim(mj−mk)→∞ a
∗
j < a
n
j . By continuity, agents with high enough equilibrium nomination
probabilities will exert lower than normal effort as well.
For mj < mk, on the other hand, the impact of a reduction in asymmetry, i.e., of
an increase in (mj −mk), is ambiguous. If r is not too steep, then equilibrium effort is
increasing in equilibrium winning probability initially but decreasing thereafter. Not also
that in the limit case where j has virtually no chance of winning, lim(mj−mk)→−∞ φj (0) =
lim(mj−mk)→−∞ ϕj (0) = 0, so the first-order condition in (A.7) implies
lim(mj−mk)→−∞ a
∗
j = a
n
j .
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table 12: German Euro 2008 team nominations and values of pastselect.
Bold letters indicate nominated players.
player
pastselect
World Cup 06
end of 07/08 season two-year average
Thomas Hitzlsperger 86.67% 60.24% Yes
Per Mertesacker 80.00% 59.66% Yes
Kevin Kuranyi 73.33% 33.43% -
Clemens Fritz 66.67% 37.94% -
Marcell Jansen 66.67% 56.97% Yes
Philipp Lahm 66.67% 75.44% Yes
Arne Friedrich 60.00% 73.93% Yes
Bastian Schweinsteiger 60.00% 81.99% Yes
Lukas Podolski 60.00% 74.25% Yes
Mario Gomez 60.00% 21.92% -
Piotr Trochowski 60.00% 34.97% -
Simon Rolfes 60.00% 22.94% -
Miroslav Klose 53.33% 71.49% Yes
Roberto Hilbert 53.33% 21.52% -
Torsten Frings 46.67% 80.45% Yes
Bernd Schneider 40.00% 74.42% Yes
Gonzalo Castro 33.33% 16.00% -
Manuel Friedrich 26.67% 37.07% -
Mike Hanke 20.00% 25.68% Yes
Tim Borowski 20.00% 43.08% Yes
Christian Pander 13.33% 5.66% -
Heiko Westermann 13.33% 2.45% -
Jan Schlaudraff 13.33% 12.82% -
Alexander Madlung 6.67% 8.67% -
Jermaine Jones 6.67% 2.67% -
Paul Freier 6.67% 3.88% -
Stefan Kiessling 6.67% 4.02% -
Fabian Ernst 0.00% 0.78% -
Gerald Asamoah 0.00% 10.58% Yes
Malik Fathi 0.00% 10.42% -
Patrick Owomoyela 0.00% 2.50% -
Sebastian Kehl 0.00% 10.67% Yes
Notes: The table includes all German players with positive average values of
pastselect, except for goalkeepers. No German player without any national team
nominations during the sample period was nominated.
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